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THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN

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THE DOCTRINE OF ETERNAL MATTER AND FORM

LOTTIE H. KENDZIERSKI

I

AVERROES

The attitude of Scholastic philosophers toward Averroes is varied. William of Auvergne considers him a *philosophus nobilissimus* whose name has been abused.[1] Roger Bacon is also sympathetic toward Averroes and speaks of him as a man of sound wisdom.[2] On the other hand, Giles of Rome says that Averroes reaffirmed all the errors of the Philosophers.[3] St. Albert the Great is convinced that Averroes con-

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[1]"De rudimentis enim philosophiae est procul dubio ratio materiae et ratio formae: et cum ipsa ratio materiae posita sit ab Averroe, philosopho nobilissimo, expedit ut intentiones ejus et aliorum qui tanquam duces philosophiae sequendi et imitandi sunt, hujusmode homines qui de rebus philosophices tam inconsiderate loqui praesumunt, apprehendissent prius ad certum et liquidum" (*De Universo*, II-II, cap. 8 [*Opera Omnia* (Aureliae: F. Hotot, 1674), I, 851b]). This is evidently William's first contact with the Commentator, and he does not yet recognize the dangers of this doctrine. Cf. also *De Anima*, cap. 3, pt. 2 (*Opera*, II, Supplement, 101a).

[2]". . . post hunc venit Averroes, homo solidae sapientiae, corrigens dicta priorum et addens multa, quamvis corrigendus sit in aliquibus, et in multis complendus" (*Opus Majus*, II, cap. 13, ed. J. H. Bridges [Oxford, 1897], II, 54).

[3]"Commentator autem omnes errores Philosophi asseruit" (*De Erroribus Philosophorum*, cap. 4, ed. P. Mandonnet, *Siger de Brabant et l'averroisme de XIIIe siècle* [2nd ed., Pars II; "Les philosophes belges," VII (Louvain, 1908)], p. 8).

tradicted his master.[4] St. Thomas Aquinas even accuses Averroes of being a corruptor of peripateticism.[5]

First, it can be shown that, like Aristotle, Averroes admits the eternity of the heavens, the eternity of species, and the eternity of the world of prime matter, movement, and time, and adds to Aristotelian doctrine principles of his own to confirm the eternity of all things. Averroes conceives the world as an eternal process of becoming or generation which cannot not exist or have any different existence than it has. The world cannot have an origin, for then one might reason from it to another and similarly originated corporeal world which had produced it and so without end; nor could it have been only a possible entity, for then one might infer a possible entity out of which it had proceeded and so on *ad infinitum*. Averroes argues against the Christians and the "Loquentes"[6] who say that the world has an origin and that an agent creates all being anew out of nothing.[7]

According to Averroes, those "Loquentes" who hold that for the possible entity something can be generated out of nothing, are merely stating vulgar opinions which are not sufficient except for those who have been nourished by them.[8] Averroes further distinguishes between "Loquentes" who say that something is made from nothing and "Loquentes" who say that an agent causes by creating a form out of nothing; he concludes that their error is manifest.[9]

For creation *ex nihilo* Averroes substitutes a continual creation in

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[4]"Averroes, cujus studium fuit semper contradicere patribus suis . . ." (*In II Phys.*, tr. 1, cap. 10 [*Opera Omnia* (Paris: Vivès, 1890-99), III, 112]).

[5]"Non tam fuit Peripateticus, quam Peripateticae philosophiae depravator" (*De Unitate Intellectus contra Averroistas*, cap. 4, ad fin., ed. L. W. Keeler, S.J. [Rome: Gregorian Univ., 1936]).

[6]The "Loquentes" are the Moslem theologians. Cf. E. Gilson, "Pourquoi saint Thomas a critiqué saint Augustin," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen age*, I (1926-27), 10.

[7]"Dicentes autem creationem dicunt, quod agens creat totum ens de novo et ex nihilo, quod non habet ad hoc, ut sit materia, in quam agat, sed creat totum, et haec est opinio Loquentium in nostra lege et lege Christianorum . . . " (*In XII Metaphys.*, com. 18 [Venice: Juntas, 1550-52; Vol. VIII, fol. 143r]). All the Averroes texts cited are taken from this edition.

[8]"Et omnia ista sunt existimationes vulgares, valde sufficientes secundum cursum, secundum quem nutriuntur homines in eis, non secundum sermonem sufficientes" (*In VIII Phys.*, com. 4 [Vol. IV, fol. 155r]).

[9]"Loquentes . . . dicere aliquid fieri ex nihilo. Et cum Loquentes nostrae legis opinabantur, quod agens agit creando formam ex nihilo. . . . Et negaverunt propter hoc potentiam esse et errorum istorum est manifestus" (*In XII Metaphys.*, com. 18 [Vol. VIII, fol. 143v]).

the world of perpetual change, becoming, and generation.[10] Creation cannot be out of nothing, but must be from something; namely, the forms of all the material objects in the universe, which, after the manner of germs, are contained potentially in matter.[11] Forms can be created, but created only in the sense that a created form existing eternally in eternal potential matter is generated from the preceding created form and so on to infinity. These material forms are in between the mere accidental forms and the pure forms; and they operate in an eternal process of matter and are never separate from matter, for matter and form can be separate only in thought.

Through powers or forms Averroes argues to the eternity of motion and the eternity of all movable things in whose nature there is motion. The power of motion is in the thing moved, as every perfection is in the thing perfected; and from the fact that the powers are in the movable thing, it follows that movement is eternal. Thus, something is not moved except in a movable body in whose nature there is motion.[12]

In analyzing the notion of forms, Averroes criticizes Plato, according to whom any power in an element is a form made in it (created) by the movements of the sun or stars. Aristotle, however, says that such a power is not a form, for if it were, it would be a something (the power would already be a form) and thus it would not be created out of nothing. According to Averroes, Plato was regarding forms from a distance; and Aristotle will show that an agent does not produce a form by creating it (out of nothing), for then something (a form) would come from nothing. Averroes will conclude that forms must be continually created one from the other, not out of nothing, but rather

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[10]Cf. A. Forest, *La structure métaphysique du concret selon saint Thomas d' Aquin,* "Études de philosophie médiévale," XIV (Paris: J. Vrin, 1931), p. 59. Cf. also M. Gorce, "Averroisme," *Dict. d'histoire et de géog. ecclésiastiques,* Vol. V col. 1035: Averroes admits eternal creation and says that Aristotle denied creation in the twelfth book of the *Metaphysics.*

[11]A. Forest, *La structure métaphysique du concret selon saint Thomas d'Aquin,* p. 162. For Averroes, becoming is substantial generation brought about by the eternal presence of matter and form.

[12]"Secundum autem nostram expositionem induxit definitionem motus, ad declarandum quod motus est in motu, quoniam declaratum sit in definitione eius quod est entelechia moti, necesse est ut sit in motu; omnis enim perfectio necesse est ut sit in re, quae perficitur. Et secundum hoc invenimus Alexandrum in suo libro de principiis inducere definitionem motus, ad declarandum motum esse aeternum. . . . hoc decepit homines in hoc, et existimaverunt ipsum declarare potentiam esse ante actum in tempore; et ipse intendebat dicere quod non dicitur moveri, nisi illud, in cuius natura est motus, scilicet corpus mobile; et quod non invenitur in immobili" (*In VIII Phys.,* com. 4 [Vol. IV, fol. 155v]).

out of something; namely, prime matter, in which all forms are in potentiality.[13] There can be no creation of a first new form or a first new matter out of nothing. If potency were not being (*ens*) there would be no agent at all; and if there were no agent, there would be nothing in act.[14] It is necessary that potentiality for that which is generated exist in it before it itself is generated. This potency not only precedes the passivity existing in the passive things according to time, but also precedes the agent power in the thing according to time. Therefore every agent that acts at some time and not at other times is necessarily sometimes in potency and sometimes not.[15]

Averroes states that some denied that there was potency preceding according to time that which it becomes, saying that potency and that which it becomes exist at the same time; and therefore there can be no potency, which, he concludes, is contrary to the nature of man.[16] For these men potency goes with the act itself, yet they do not deny the nature of the possible.[17] Averroes will, therefore, distinguish between potency and act and, says that it is impossible for potency and act to exist simultaneously.[18]

Since there is no absolute beginning or destruction of things, genera-

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[13]"Istae autem proportiones et virtutes, quae fiunt in elementis a motibus solis et aliarum stellarum, sunt hae, quas reputat Plato esse formas, et eas intendit; sed longe respiciebat eas, quapropter dicit formas esse. Aristotelis autem sustentatur super hoc, scilicet quod agens non invenit formam, creando eam; quoniam, si creasset eam, tunc aliquid fieret ex nihilo. Et ideo dicitur quod omnes proportiones et formae sunt in potentia in prima materia" (*In XII Metaphys.*, com. 18 [Vol. VIII, fol. 143v]).

[14]"Si igitur potentia non esset ens, non esset agens omnino. Et si agens non esset, nihil esset hic omnino in actu" (*ibid.*).

[15]". . . necesse est igitur, ut potentia ad illud, quod generatur, existat in eo ante ipsum generatum. Et ista potentia non tantum praecedit passionem existentem in passivo secundum tempus, sed etiam praecedit secundum tempus virtutem agentem in agente, . . . Et ideo omne agens, quod potest agere quandoque et quandoque non, necessario invenitur quandoque potentia, et quandoque non. Et omnia ista sunt necessaria, et vera" (*In VIII Phys.*, com. 4 [Vol. IV, fol. 155rv]).

[16]"Quidam negant potentiam praecedere secundum tempus illud, ad quod potest, dicendo quod potentia, et illud ad quod potest sunt insimul, ex quo contingit nullam potentiam esse. . . . Et iste sermo existimatur nunc a quibusdam loquentium et est sermo contrarius naturae hominis" (*In IX Metaphys.*, com. 5 [Vol. VIII, fol. 108r]).

[17]"Et iam fuerant aliqui homines temporibus praeteritis ante hanc nostram tempestatem, qui negebant possibilitatem praecedentem rem possibilem et ponebant posse cum ipso actu quare cum tollerent penitus naturam possibilis, sequitur secundum ipsos quod possibile sit necessarium et necessarium possibile" (*Epitome Metaphysices*, Tract. III [Vol. VIII, fol. 177r]).

[18]"Potentia enim opponitur actui, et impossibile est ut existant in simul" (*In IX Metaphys.*, com. 5 [Vol. VIII, fol. 108r]). Cf. *In I Phys.*, com. 79 (Vol. IV, fol. 21v), where Averroes shows that the heavenly bodies do not

tion is required to account for the procession of things from potency to act. And because forms and things in act are not subject to change or generation, change and generation must be applied essentially to another form of being; namely, being in potency or matter. If there is generation, it is either from nonbeing or being; if from nonbeing, then nonbeing is changed into being. If generation is from being, it would happen that there would be something before it is. Generation has to be from nonbeing and being; it is from nonbeing accidentally because it is from being in potency or matter to which privation (which is absolute nonbeing) belongs. Generation is from being essentially for it belongs to matter which is being in potency.[19] Generation and corruption are applied to forms only accidentally; that is, by the generation and corruption of the composite.[20] There can be no absolute origin or extinction of forms. In the infinite generation of forms, like is always generated by like, as a man from a man and a horse from a horse;[21] and thus everything proceeds from potency to act and back again to potency. All forms are thus in potentiality in prime matter;[22] and in the eternal generation of forms from prime matter, the composite is changed until that which is in potency becomes a form in act.[23]

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have matter at all because then they would be generated and corrupted because of the mixture of privation with their nature. There is no other cause of generation and corruption than prime matter because of the nonbeing which is mixed in its substance: ". . . corpora coelestia non habent materiam omnino . . . tunc essent generabilia, et corruptibilia propter mixtionem privationis cum natura eorum. Nihil aliud enim est causa generationis et corruptionis quod prima materia propter non esse, quod istum est in substantia eius."

[19]"Dictum est enim illic quod, si generatio est, aut est ex non esse, aut ex esse, si ex non esse, ergo non esse transfertur in esse, si ex esse, contingit ut sit ens, antequam sit. . . . Dicendo quod generatio fit ex non ente accidentaliter, quia est ex ente potentialiter, scilicet materia, cui accidit privatio, quae est non ens simpliciter. Et etiam est ex non ente in actu accidentaliter. Accidit enim materiae, ex qua est generatio, essentialiter, quod fuit non ens in actu et ens in potentia. . . . Quod generabile non generatur ex ente accidentaliter, sed entia essentialiter, scilicet ex ente in potentia . . ." (*In XII Metaphys.*, com. 8 [Vol. VIII, fol. 140r]).

[20]"Et ideo forma apud ipsum non habet generationem, neque corruptionem, nisi accidentaliter, scilicet per generationem et corruptionem compositi" (*ibid.*, com. 18 [Vol. VIII, fol. 143v]).

[21]". . . necesse est cum generatio et corruptio eorum, quae sunt apud nos perpetuae sint, ponere motus ex se semper . . . homo generatur semper ab homine, et equus ab equo . . ." (*In VIII* Phys., com. 46 [Vol. IV, fol. 176r]).

[22]"Et ideo dicitur quod omnes proportiones et formae sunt in potentia in prima materia" (*In XII Metaphys.*, com. 18 [Vol. VIII, fol. 143v]).

[23]". . . agens non facit nisi compositum ex materia et forma. Et hoc fit movendo et transmutando eam, donec exeat de ea illud, quod est de potentia in ea, ad illam formam in actu" (*ibid.*).

Prime matter is of its nature intended to receive all forms and must be in potency to all forms.[24] If in its own nature prime matter were formed, it would not receive forms unless being were generated from being.[25] Potency has its realization only in things that are in act, and this is what Averroes means when he says that prime matter is not a being in act, but has being in a being in act and is not distinct from it; and this is the meaning of the statement that prime matter is in potency.[26] Nor can prime matter be mere privation, for if it were, nothing at all could be generated from it.[27] Prime matter is, therefore, composed of being and nonbeing.[28]

Prime matter in its own nature is not formed, but is able to receive all forms. If matter had its own form, says Averroes, there would be no movement or change nor even generation or corruption. Prime matter is one principle common to all changeable beings and is not one in itself such that it is a simple substance actually existing, nor is it something composed of matter and form. If prime matter were to have its own form, it would be permanent and could not receive any other forms; it would immediately be replaced by the generation of other forms. Whatever receives something does not receive it according as it is in act, but according as it is in potency. If, therefore, prime matter of its own nature is intended to receive all forms, it must be in potency to all forms and cannot have in its own nature a form by which it is matter. Further, if prime matter were something existing in act and having a form, then generation in a substance would merely be an alteration, thus making forms accidents.[29] From the fact

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[24]"Si igitur prima materia innata est recipere omnes formas, necesse est ut sint in potentia omni formae . . ." (*In I Phys.*, com. 69 [Vol. IV, fol. 19v]).

[25]"Et, si in sua natura esset formata, non reciperet formas, nisi ens generetur ex ente" (*ibid.*, com. 79 [Vol. IV, fol. 21v]).

[26]"Ens enim in potentia non invenitur, nisi in ente in actu. . . . prima materia non est ens in actu, sed est ens in ente in actu, non distinctum ab eo. Et haec est intentio nostri sermonis quod est in eo in potentia" (*In III de Caelo*, com. 29 [Vol. V, fol. 92v-93r]). In the same text Averroes criticizes some "Loquentes" who confuse the meaning of potency and nonbeing, and insert into the notion of nonbeing a certain essence which is distinct from form and call this essence a vacuum. This, Averroes continues, is impossible; for a body cannot be separate from the ten categories, and there cannot be some essence which is in potency and act at the same time. There is a difference between nonbeing and being in potency; being in potency is in something or is a part of something, and nonbeing is not even part of something.

[27]"Quemadmodum, si in sua natura esset privatio simpliciter, tunc opinio nihil generaretur ex ea" (*In I Phys.*, com. 79 [Vol. IV, fol. 21v]).

[28]"Est igitur quasi composita ex esse et non esse" (*ibid.*).

[29]"Deinde dicit ista igitur natura est unum principium, et . . . ista

that forms exist eternally in material things, Averroes will say that things in motion are eternal, just as motion itself is eternal. Not only is motion eternal, but there cannot be a first motion. Averroes then distinguishes between motion and generation and shows that there cannot be a first motion or a first generation. The first temporal motion is not the motion of generation, for the motion of generation is not a motion, but the end of motion.[30] It is impossible that there be a first in generation according to time or according to nature, for that motion whose end is generation is not able to have a first.[31] Thus, since generation is the end of motion, there can be no first in generation; and since eternal motion is continuous, it is circular.[32]

Averroes distinguishes between motion and time, and says that either time and motion are the same or time is a certain passion of motion, for without time it is impossible to imagine motion.[33] If there be time, therefore, it is also necessary that there be motion, for time is the number of motion.[34] Since motion is eternal, and since time is the number of motion, it is possible to conceive of an infinite and eternal time. Averroes argues against creation in time and says that if time is said

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natura, quae est prima materia, est unum principium commune omnibus entibus transmutabilibus, quae alterantur in invicem, sed non est una in se, ita quod sit substantia simplex existens actu, neque ita quod sit aliquod compositum ex materia, et forma, nam, si haberet formam propriam, nullam aliam recipere ipsa permanente, sed statim corrumperetur quod cito alia forma generaret. Et etiam quicquid recipit aliquid non recipit ipsum secundum quod est in actu, sed secundum quod est in potentia. Si igitur prima materia innata est recipere omnes formas, necesse est ut sint in potentia omni formae, et ut non habeat in sua substantia formam propriam, qua est materia. Et etiam, si esset aliquod existens in actum, habens formam, tunc generatio in substantia esset alteratio et formae essent accidentia" (*ibid.*, com. 69 [Vol. IV, fol. 19v]).

[30]"Et non debet aliquis dicere quod primus motus temporalis est motus generationis. Motus enim generationis non est motus, sed finis motus" (*In VIII Phys.*, com. 7 [Vol. IV, fol. 156r]).

[31]"Et impossibile est ut sit primus secundum tempus, aut secundum naturam, nec motus, cuius finis est generatio, est possibile, ut sit primus" (*ibid.*).

[32]". . . impossibile est ut motus aeternus sit, nisi motus circularis" (*ibid.*). Cf. *In XII Metaphys.*, com. 29 (Vol. VIII, fol. 147v): ". . . tempus est continuum, et aeternum, et unum, necesse est ut motus seternus sit continuus et unus . . . Deinde dicit sed non invenitur motus continuus, nisi in loco, et existens circularis, et impossibile est ut iste motus sit, nisi localis et circularis, ut declaratum est in *Physic.*"

[33]"Tempus enim et motus aut sunt idem aut tempus est aliqua passio eius sine enim tempore impossibile est imaginari motum" (*In XII Metaphys.*, com. 29 [Vol. VIII, fol. 147v]).

[34]". . . necesse est, si tempus sit, ut sit motus, scilicet motus cuius numerus est tempus, incepit declarare tempus esse aeternum . . ." (*In VIII Phys.*, com. 11 [Vol. IV, fol. 157v]).

to be made, it is necessary that it be made in time, wherefore time will be before time and so on to infinity.[35] It follows that before time there must be time and after time there must be time.[36]

Averroes, like Aristotle, proves the eternity of time from the standpoint of the instant. The instant is found only in time, and thus it is impossible for time to be outside the instant; the instant, thus, makes time.[37] It is impossible to imagine an instant which is not the end of the past and the beginning of the future; the instant is that which the intellect considers as the difference between the past and the future; that is, the before and after in motion.[38] The instant is time in act.[39] Since the instant is the beginning of the future time and end of the past time, it follows that time is eternal.[40] And, since continuous and circular motion are eternal, and since time is eternal, it follows that time principally and essentially follows this motion.[41]

Averroes has established the eternity of forms, the eternity of matter, the eternity of motion, and the eternity of time. Creation in time cannot be admitted; the only creation that exists is one of eternally generated forms, which forms are necessarily eternal and which eternally generate into further forms of their own; for example, a man generates from man to eternity. Generation and corruption are only in the composite and belong essentially to matter; thus they affect forms only accidentally—that is, in the composite. Thus forms and species must be eternal, and only the individuals in the species suffer generation and corruption.

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[35]"Si igitur tempus ponatur esse factum, necesse est fieri in tempore. Quapropter tempus erit ante tempus, et sic in infinitum" (*In XII Metaphys.*, com. 29 [Vol. VIII, fol. 147v]).

[36]". . . et sic necessario ante tempus erit tempus et post tempus tempus" (*In VIII Phys.*, com. 11 [Vol. IV, fol. 157v]).

[37]". . . instans nunquam invenitur nisi in tempore, et ideo quod impossibile est tempus esse extra instans. Et causa in hoc est quia instans facit tempus, et ideo qui non percepit ad minus duo instantia non percepit tempus" (*ibid.*).

[38]". . . instans est principium futuri et finis praeteriti. Et ista propositio est manifesta per se, instans enim est illud quod accipit intellectus pro differentia inter praeteritum et futurum, scilicet prius et posterius in motu. Et cum natura instantis est ista, manifestum est quod impossibile est imaginari instans quod non est finis praeteriti et principium futuri" (*ibid.*).

[39]". . . nihil invenitur de tempore in actu, nisi instans et cum hoc impossibile est demonstrari sicut demonstratur hunc et quid, cum demonstratur transit statim" (*ibid.*).

[40]"Et cum posuit instans esse principium et finem, incepit declarare quommodo sequetur ex hoc ut tempus sit aeternum . . ." (*ibid.*).

[41]"Et forte scitur de hac demonstratione hoc, quod motus aeternus est motus diurnus, declaratum est enim . . . quod tempus non sequitur primo et essentialiter, nisi hunc motum" (*ibid.*).

II

ST. THOMAS'S OPPOSITION TO AVERROES

St. Thomas Aquinas enumerates the Averroistic arguments in favor of the eternity of motion, the eternity of time, the eternity of prime matter, the eternal generation of forms, and the eternity of incorruptible things, and at the same time refutes these arguments in favor of the doctrine of creation which he will seek to establish.

For Averroes, nothing begins to be moved except through the mover of the thing moved being otherwise than it was before; but what is otherwise than it was before is moved; and therefore before every new motion there was a previous motion and thus motion and the thing moved always were.[42] St. Thomas's answer to this objection is that Aristotle's argument here is valid against those who admitted the existence of eternal movable things but denied the eternity of motion.[43] St. Thomas's solution to this argument is that the first movable thing, since it began to be when it was not, was brought about not through change, but rather through creation.[44] According to St. Thomas, Aris-

[42]"Nihil de novo incipit moveri, nisi per hoc quod movens et mobile aliter se habet nunc quam prius. Sed quod aliter se habet nunc quam prius, movetur. Ergo ante omnem motum de novo incipientem, fuit aliquis motus. Motus ergo semper fuit. Ergo et mobile, quia motus non est nisi in mobile" (St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 46, a. 1, obj. 5). "Relinquitur ergo quod ante omnem motum de novo incipientem, fuit alius motus" (*ibid.*, obj. 6). Cf. *In Lib. de Causis*, lect. 11 (ed. Mandonnet, p. 254): "Et sequeretur ulterius, mundum semper fuisse. Haec enim videtur esse efficacissima ratio ponentium aeternitatem mundi, quae sumitur ex immobilitate factoris. Non enim videtur posse contingere quod aliquod agens nunc incipiat operari, cum prius non operatur fuerit, si omnino immobiliter se habeat, nisi forte aliqua exteriori mutatione praesupposita; quia ut Averrois in octavo Physicorum commentans prosequitur, si aliquod agens voluntarium vult aliquid facere post et non prius, ad minus oportet quod imaginetur tempus quod est numerus motus. Et ideo concludit impossibile esse quod ex voluntate immobili et aeterna proveniat effectus novus, nisi praesupposito motu. Et quid haec videtur esse efficacior ratio qua utuntur ad probandum aeternitatem mundi . . ." Cf. also Averroes, *In VIII Phys.*, com. 7 (Vol. IV, fol. 156r): "Et impossibile est ut sit primus secundum tempus, aut secundum naturam, nec motus, cuius finis est generatio, est possibile, ut sit primus."

[43]"Unde patet quod haec ratio, quam ponit Aristoteles in VIII Phys. procedit contra eos qui ponebant mobilia aeterna, sed motum non aeternum, ut patet ex opinionibus Anaxagorae et Empedoclis. Nos autem ponimus, ex quo mobilia incoeperunt, semper fuisse motum" (*ST*, I, q. 46, a. 1 ad 5).

[44]"Dicendum quod primus motor semper eodem modo se habuit; primum autem mobile non semper eodem modo se habuit, quia incoepit esse, cum prius non fuisset. Sed hoc non fuit per mutationem, sed per creationem, quae non est mutatio . . ." (*ibid.*). On creation and change, cf. *In II Sent.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 2 ad 2; *ST*, I q. 45, a. 2 ad 2; *Contra Gentiles*, II, cap. 17-18;

totle was concerned with the term of motion, whereby creation is neither motion nor the term of motion.[45]

The argument for the eternity of time is necessarily included in the eternity of motion, for time is the measure of motion.[46] St. Thomas's reply to this objection is that since *beginning* and *end* in time are the same as in motion, supposing the eternity of motion, it is necessary that any given moment in motion be a beginning and end of motion; but this need not be if motion has a beginning.[47] Aristotle, therefore, brought forth this reason against those who asserted the eternity of time but denied the eternity of motion.[48]

The argument for the eternity of prime matter and the eternity of forms states that if the world began to exist, it was a possible being before it began to exist; but since possible being is matter which is in potency to existence, matter must have existed before the world. And since matter can never exist without form, the world must be eternal.[49]

De Pot., q. 3, a. 3, resp. On creation as the complete production of a being, cf. *In II Sent.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 2, sol.; *De Pot.*, q. 3, a. 1, resp.; *ST*, I, q. 45, a. 6, sol.; *In VIII Phys.*, lect. 2, nn. 4 and 17; *In de Caelo et Mundo*, I, lect. 29.

[45]"Dicendum quod verbum illud Philosophi intelligitur de fieri quod est per motum, vel quod est terminus motus. Creatio autem neque est motus neque terminus motus . . ." (*ST*, I, q. 46, a. 3 ad 2).

[46]". . . tempus nec incipere nec desinere potest. Et per consequens nec motus, cuius numerus tempus est" (*ST*, I, q. 46, a. 1, obj. 7). Cf. Averroes, *In VIII Phys.*, com. 11 (Vol. IV, fol. 157v): ". . . necesse est, si tempus sit, ut sit motus, scilicet motus cuius numerus est tempus, incepit declarare tempus esse aeternum . . ."

[47]"Dicendum quod sicut dicitur in IV Phys. 'prius et posterius est in tempore', secundum quod 'prius et posterius est in motu'. Unde principium et finis accipienda sunt in tempore sicut et in motu. Supposita autem aeternitate motus, necesse est quod quodlibet momentum in motu acceptum sit principium et terminus motus; quod non oportet, si motus incipiat" (*ST*, I, q. 46, a. 1 ad 7). Cf. Averroes, *In VIII Phys.*, com. 11 (Vol. IV, fol. 157v): "Et cum instans esse principium et finem, incepit declarare quommodo sequetur ex hoc ut tempus sit aeternum . . ."

[48]"Unde Aristoteles hanc rationem inducit in VIII Phys. contra eos qui ponebant aeternitatem temporis, sed negabant aeternitatem motus" (St. Thomas, *ST*, I q. 46, a. 1 ad 7).

[49]"Omne enim quod incoepit esse, antequam fuerit, possibile fuit ipsum esse; alioquin impossibile fuisset ipsum fieri. Si ergo mundus incoepit esse, antequam inciperet, possibile fuit ipsum esse. Sed quod possibile est esse, est materia, quae est in potentia ad esse, quod est per formam, et ad non esse, quod est per privationem. Si ergo mundus incoepit esse, ante mundum fuit materia. Sed non potest esse materia sine forma; materia autem mundi cum forma est mundus. Fuit ergo mundus antequam esse inciperet, quod est impossibile" (*ST*, I, q. 46, a. 1, obj. 1). Cf. Averroes, *In VIII Phys.*, com. 4 (Vol. IV, fol. 155rv): ". . . omne agens, quod potest agere quandoque et quandoque non, necessario invenitur quandoque potentia, et quandoque non. Et omnia ista sunt necessaria, et vera." *In XII Metaphys.*, com. 18 (Vol. VIII, fol. 143r): "Dicentes autem creationem

Averroes insists on an eternal generation of forms from matter;[50] this generation is necessarily eternal since there can be no first in generation and motion.[51] St. Thomas's solution to this argument is that before the world existed it was possible for it to be, not according to a passive power which is matter, but according to the active power of God.[52]

Still another argument for an eternal world is taken from the eternity of incorruptible things which have the power to exist eternally.[53] In answering this objection, St. Thomas says that Aristotle did not intend to prove that incorruptible things never began to exist, but that they did not begin by the natural mode whereby things generated and corrupted begin.[54] Since matter and the heavens are unbegotten, they have no beginning and thus the universe cannot be said to begin to exist.[55] St. Thomas's reply is that Aristotle proves that

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dicunt, quod agens creat totum ens de novo et ex nihilo, quod non habet ad hoc, ut sit materia, in quam agat, sed creat totum . . ." *In VIII Phys.*, com. 4 (Vol. IV, fol. 155r), those who hold that for the possible something can be generated out of nothing are merely stating vulgar opinions which are insufficient.

[50]". . . omnes proportiones et formae sunt in potentia in prima materia" (*In XII Metaphys.*, com. 18 [Vol. VIII, fol. 143v]). ". . . agens non facit nisi compositum ex materia et forma. Et hoc fit movendo et transmutando eam, donec exeat de ea illud, quod est de potentia in ea, ad illam formam in actu" (*ibid.*). ". . . necesse est cum generatio et corruptio eorum, quae sunt apud nos perpetuae sint, ponere motus ex se semper . . . homo generatur semper ab homine . . ." (*In VIII Phys.*, com. 46 [Vol. IV, fol. 176r]).

[51]"Et impossibile est ut sit primus secundum tempus, aut secundum naturam, nec motus, cuius finis est generatio, est possibile ut sit primus" (*In VIII Phys.*, com. 7 [Vol. IV, fol. 156r]).

[52]"Dicendum quod antequam mundus esset, possibile fuit mundum esse, non quidem secundum potentiam passivam, quae est materia, sed secundum potentiam activam Dei" (*ST*, I, q. 46, a. 1 ad 1).

[53]"Nihil quod habet virtutem ut sit semper, quandoque est et quandoque non est, quia ad quantum se extendit virtus alicuius rei, tandiu est. Sed omne incorruptibile habet virtutem ut sit semper; non enim virtutem habet ad determinatum durationis tempus. Nihil ergo incorruptibile quandoque est et quandoque non est. Sed omne quod incipit esse, quandoque est et quandoque non est. Nullum ergo incorruptibile incipit esse. Sed multa sunt in mundo incorruptibilia, et corpora caelestia et omnes substantiae intellectuales. Ergo mundus non incoepit esse" (St. Thomas *ST*, I, q. 46, a. 1, obj. 2). Cf. Averroes, *In I Phys.*, com. 79 (Vol. IV, fol. 21v): ". . . corpora coelestia non habent materiam omnino . . . tunc essent generabilia, et corruptibilia propter mixtionem privationis cum natura eorum."

[54]"Dicendum quod illud quod habet virtutem ut sit semper, ex quo habet illam virtutem, non quandoque est et quandoque non est; sed antequam haberet illam virtutem, non fuit. Unde haec ratio, quae ponitur ab Aristotele in I de Caelo, non concludit simpliciter quod incorruptibilia non incoeperunt esse, sed quod non incoeperunt esse per modum naturalem, quo generabilia et corruptibilia incipiunt esse" (*ST*, I, q. 46, a. 1 ad 2).

[55]"Nullum ingenitum incoepit esse. Sed Philosophus in I Phys. dicit quod

matter is unbegotten because it has no subject from which to derive its existence, and the heavens are unbegotten since they have no contrary from which to be generated. No conclusion follows either way except that matter and the heavens did not begin by generation.[56]

In concluding his refutation of the arguments in favor of an eternal world, St. Thomas shows two arguments that have been used in favor of the doctrine of creation in time. These concern the immortality of souls and the impossibility of traversing infinites. If the world were eternal, the number of the dead would necessarily be infinite, and thus an infinite number of souls would coexist; but the coexistence of an infinite number of things is impossible.[57] St. Thomas develops the argument from immortal souls and starts with certain suggestions made by Maimonides and Averroes. According to St. Thomas, those who hold an eternal world evade this argument in many ways.[58] They do

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'materia est ingenita' et in I de Caelo, quod caelum est ingenitum. Non ergo universitas rerum incoepit esse" (*ibid.*, a. 1, obj. 3).

[56]Dicendum quod Aristoteles in I Phys. probat 'materiam esse ingenitam', per hoc quod 'non habet subiectum' de quo sit. In I autem de Caelo, probat caelum ingenitum, quia non habet contrarium ex quo generetur. Unde patet quod per utrumque non concluditur nisi quod materia et caelum non incoeperunt per generationem, ut quidam ponebant, praecipue de caelo. Nos autem dicimus quod materia et caelum producta sunt in esse per creationem . . ." (*ibid.*, a. 1 ad 3).

[57]"Si mundus et generatio semper fuit, infiniti homines praecesserunt. Sed anima hominis est immortalis. Ergo infinitae animae humanae nunc essent actu; quod est impossibile. Ergo ex necessitate sciri potest quod mundus incoeperit, et non sola fide tenetur" (*ibid.*, a. 2, obj. 8). Cf. *In I Sent.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 5, sol.: ". . . si mundus semper fuit, homines semper fuerunt. Ergo infiniti homines sunt mortui ante nos. Sed homine moriente non moritur anima ejus, sed manet. Ergo modo sunt infinitae animae in actu a corporibus absolutae. Sed impossible est mundum semper fuisse." *ST*, I, q. 46, a. 2 ad 8: "Quidam enim non reputant impossibile esse infinitas animas actu, ut patet in Metaph. Algazelis, dicentis hoc esse infinitum per accidens." St. Thomas says that the impossibility of an infinite in act (whether simultaneous or successive) cannot be proved, and that it cannot be demonstrated that God cannot make an infinite in act—*De Aeternitate Mundi* (ed. Mandonnet, p. 24): ". . . et praeterea adhuc non est demonstratum quod Deus non possit facere ut sint infinita actu." In *ST*, III, q. 10. a. 3 ad 2, St. Thomas says that infinity can exist according to multiplicity: ". . . sic igitur si essent infiniti homines numero, haberent quidam infinitatem secundum aliquid, scilicet secundum multitudinem; secundum tamen essentiae rationem haberent finitatem eo quod omnium essentia esset limitata sub ratione unius speciei."

[58]"Dicendum quod hanc rationem ponentes aeternitatem mundi multipliciter effugiunt" (*ST*, q. 46, a. 2 ad 8). On St. Thomas's resolution of this argument, cf. Gerard Smith, S.J., *Natural Theology* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1951), p. 99, n. 8: St. Thomas says that *if* this argument holds, then you cannot say that the number of souls can be proved to be finite. But, St. Thomas answers, *if* such is the conclusion, then you cannot grant the possi-

so either by denying the immortality of the soul and saying that the soul is corrupted with the body;[59] or that of all souls only one will remain;[60] or that it is not impossible that there be an actual infinity of souls because they have no order among them.[61]

St. Thomas uses Maimonides' argument of the impossibility of traversing infinites[62] and demonstrates that it would lead to an addition, and therefore one infinite would be greater than another.[63]

Having enumerated the arguments against an eternal world, St. Thomas's conclusion is that creation remains as the only satisfactory explanation of the origin of the world and the origin of all being. In his theory of creation, St. Thomas does not stop at physics or the science of being from the standpoint of movement, as Aristotle and Averroes have done. Creation or the philosophical explanation of the origin of being embraces not only the world of change and movement, but also the entire world of being, in which change and movement are contained.

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bility of *men* being from eternity; nevertheless, *angels* do not generate, and hence within infinite time there would not have been an actually existent infinite number of *angels*. Now, so he contends, the proposition was not that this or that *kind* of individual could be from eternity—for instance, man—but that *some* creature could be from eternity—for instance, angels.

[59]"Quidam vero dicunt [Algazel] animam corrumpi cum corpore" (*ST*, I, q. 46, a. 2 ad 8). "Quidam namque aeternitatem mundi ponentium posuerunt etiam humanas animas non esse post corpus" (*CG*, II, cap. 38).

[60]". . . quidam vero, quod ex animabus non manet nisi intellectus separatus, vel agens, secundum quosdam, vel etiam possibilis, secundum alios" (*CG*, II, cap. 38). St. Thomas attributes this position to Averroes.

[61]"Quidam autem posuerunt circulationem in animabus, dicentes quod eadem animae, post aliqua saecula, in corpora revertuntur, quidam vero pro inconvenienti non habent quod sint aliqua actu in his quae ordinem non habent" (*ibid.*).

[62]Cf. Maimonides, *Dux seu Director Dubitantium aut Perplexorum* (Paris, 1520), Lib. I, cap. 74, fol. 37r: "Et sequitur secundum suam estimationem in ista probatione quod infinitum sit maius infinito . . . Postea vero addunt vel minuunt de illa cogitatione quae ascendit in cor." On this point, cf. also H. Wolfson, *The Kalam Arguments for Creation in Saadia, Averroes, Maimonides and St. Thomas* (New York: Academy for Jewish Research, 1943), pp. 244-45; J. Guttmann, *Das Verhältnis des Thomas von Aquino zum Judenthum und zur Judischen Litteratur* (Göttingen, 1891), pp. 62-65.

[63]". . . sed infinita non est maius, nec potest esse" (*In II Sent.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 5, sol.); ". . . sequitur quod infinito fiat additio" (*CG*, II, cap. 38). Cf. also *Quodlibet.*, IX, q. 1, a. 1 and XII, q. 2, a. 2; *ST*, I, q. 46, a. 2 ad 8.

JUDGMENT IN ST. THOMAS

FRANCIS A. CUNNINGHAM, S.J.

The word "judgment" does not seem to have been the proper term for the second operation of the intellect in St. Thomas. In fact, it appears that this is the only operation in any cognitive faculty in which a sound Thomistic judgment does not take place.

The Suarezians, following one set of texts, focused attention on a *perspicientia nexus*, $S \leftarrow$ is $\rightarrow P$. This is the correct interpretation, I believe, for the second operation of the mind with self-evident principles. The Scotists, already preoccupied with another set of texts, were concerned with the proper object of the faculty $\frac{P}{S} \rightarrow \frac{\text{form}}{\text{matter}}$. And they too, were right in their understanding of "judgment." The common assumption, however, that they were both describing the same thing, is, I think, unwarranted.

I cannot find any solid textual basis in St. Thomas for identifying these two different relations with one word. The strongest argument, to my mind, is that of silence. If St. Thomas thought the second operation was a judgment, he should have said so. He never predicates either one or the other *in recto*. He treats them as different concepts. Moreover, the angels exercised a Thomistic judgment without any second operation. And the senses did, too.

The first operation of the intellect is necessary and infallible in its judgment of its proper object *per modum inclinationis*. St. Thomas does not presume to judge the first truth as it stands revealed either in first principles—*dignitates, axiomata*, axioms—or in the beatific vision. He refers other matters for judgment *per modum cognitionis* to the third operation. There the certitude of the intellectual virtues supply for instinct—wisdom, for instinct in necessary matter; prudence, for instinct in contingent.

The different operations are distinguished according to their preparation of the intelligible species. This intelligible species may be

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abstracted directly from the phantasm of the material thing itself. That is the first operation. It may be constructed by a combination of such individual concepts with the mind joining or dividing *S* and *P*.



That is the second operation. Or it may be derived from an arrangement of such combinations, as in a syllogism. That is the third operation. In any case, the intelligible species is a principle which informs the intellect-in-potency and accordingly must precede its term, the concept or mental *verbum*.

Judgment marks the terminal stage of a series of intellectual acts; that is, the apprehension, → intention, → deliberation, → judgment. St. Thomas never calls any of these acts an operation. They have nothing to do with the elaboration of the intelligible species. They are not actions in the verb sense—for instance, *intelligere,* implying motions; they are acts in the Thomistic sense of a perfection—for instance, *intentio intellecta.* They inhere in, and are functions of, the *verbum.* They are a *processus rationis.*

The first three steps point in the same direction, and they are graded in their progress along the path of discovery, the *via inventiva.* The *via judicativa* points in the opposite direction. Judgment analyzes and resolves a complex problem into the terms of the proper object of the faculty. It is infallible with the certitude of science, because so long as the faculty exists, its judgment concerning its own proper object does not fail.

These two sets of distinctions often overlap. St. Thomas uses both words, "judgment" and "the second operation," in connection with the same proposition, much as we might use the terms "salary" and "rent" for "money," or speak of a white-hot object as something which was also soft and sweet. St. Thomas must be read formally. He brings out the difference of the terms in his syntax, using the gerund for the motion involved in a human operation and *per* with the accusative for the principle of any *actus perfecti.* Loose language has

been very misleading. A judgment is formulated in the second operation, even though it may also be formed elsewhere. Both are needed. The mere fact that we do not have two technical terms in current usage to differentiate these two relations is no sufficient reason for assuming St. Thomas was confused, too. For those, of course, who do not recognize any distinction between the operation of the intellect and the intellect-in-act, this refinement of that distinction must be altogether meaningless.

I

THE OPERATIONS OF THE MIND

A

ARISTOTLE

The different operations of the mind have come down to us from Aristotle by way of St. Thomas. The classic source is *De anima* iii. 6.

> The thinking then of the simple objects of thought is found in those cases where falsehood is impossible: where the alternative of true or false applies, there we always find a putting together of objects of thought in a quasi-unity. As Empedocles said that 'where heads of many a creature sprouted without necks' they afterwards by Love's power were combined, so here, too, objects of thought which were given separate are combined, e.g. 'incommensurate' and 'diagonal.'[1]

Aristotle obviously backed into this distinction from the language level. For him, grammar is merely a projection of one's logic. Spoken words are the symbols of mental experiences."[2] Here are two concrete forms of expression, words as they stand alone—*S* or *P*, *vox incomplexa*—and combinations of words as they stand in a sentence—*S* is *P*, *vox complexa*. These are signs. What are the things signified? He extrapolates. "Nouns and verbs, provided nothing is added, are like thoughts without combination or separation."[3]

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[1]W. D. Ross (ed.), *The Works of Aristotle* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1928), III, 430a26-32 (tr. by J. A. Smith).

[2]*Ibid.*, I, "De interpretatione," 16a4 (tr. by E. M. Edghill).

[3]*Ibid.*, 16a12.

Arist.:[4]	Hē men oun tōn adiaretōn noēsis	Synthesis tis ēdē[4] noēmaton hōsper hen outōn
Smith:[5]	the thinking of simple objects of thought	a putting together of objects of thought in a quasi-unity
Hett:[6]	the thinking of indivisible unities	a compounding of thoughts made into a fresh unity
Dominican:[7]	intelligence of what is not complex	some composition of things understood as of many brought to a unity
Ver. Antiqua:[8]	*indivisibilium intelligentia*	*compositio quaedam intellectuum sicut eorum quae unum fiunt*
Ver. Recens:[9]	*individuarum rerum intellectio*	*compositio quaedam intelligibilium ut quasi unum sint*
Arabs:[10]	*imaginatio per intellectum*	*fides*
and so on	*informatio intellectus*	

There is no mention of any judgment here. The text itself does not give us more than a contrast between the objects of two operations. In one, the unity of an "incomposite"[11] concept (P) is derived from the object itself. In the other, the unity of the "composite" concept (S is P) is constructed by the mind. Terms : concepts :: propositions : combinations of concepts.

The context supplies us with an analogy which compares the mental structure of a proposition to the poet Empedocles's idea of evolution. First, heads grow up out of the ground by chance without necks. Then, some new force puts heads and necks together. So, too, we first derive concepts directly from the material things; then we make up new combinations ourselves. Heads from earth : concepts by abstraction :: heads on necks : combinations formed by the mind.

The example he uses of the "incommensurate" and the "diagonal" would be singularly inappropriate if he had any further development

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[4]*De anima* iii 6, 430a26. Unless otherwise noted, all Aristotle references are to the *Opera Omnia*, ed. I. Bekker (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1831), I and II.

[5]Ross (ed.), *Works of Aristotle*, III, 430a26.

[6]*On the Soul*, tr. by W. S. Hett ("Loeb Classical Library." Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1935), p. 171.

[7]*Aristotle's* De Anima *with the Commentary of St. Thomas Aquinas*, tr. by Kenelm Foster and Sylvester Humphries (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1951), p. 433. This translation will be used for *De anima* unless otherwise noted.

[8]Quoted in St. Thomas Aquinas, *Opera Omnia* (Parma, 1866), II, 124.

[9]*Ibid.;* also in Aristotle, *Opera*, III, 430a26.

[10]*De Ver.*, q. 14, a. 1; *In I Sent.*, d. 19, q. 5, a. 1 ad 7; *In I Post. Anal.*, lect. 1, etc.

[11]Ross (ed.), *Works of Aristotle*, VIII, "Metaphysica," 1051b18 (tr. by W. D. Ross).

in mind, such as a contrast between a mathematical essence and actual existence[12] or that of an inward-going cognitive element *versus* an outward-going appetitive.[13] Aristotle, it seems, never thought of the distinction between essence and existence.[14] His vocabulary here is altogether cognitive; that is, *nous, dianoia.*[15] The whole tendency in Aristotle is to sharpen the distinction between the various powers of the soul rather than to unify them. He does not use any term at all for the judgment of a proper object.

B

ST. THOMAS

Aristotle peers down into the pool of our thoughts with an uncannily clear gaze. His vantage point is language. This a posteriori approach is safe. He does not get his feet wet. And he does not get his operations mixed up with "judgment" either. But he does not see very far down into the pool. He never attempts to conjecture why there should be different operations with their different relations to the world outside the mind. He is not interested in any ontological principle behind them. And he fails to recognize the third operation, even though he was making use of it unconsciously. He never formulated the third operation of the intellect even though it was a legitimate prolongation of his principle of distinction; and, as a matter of fact, he was actually making use of it unwittingly when he arranged his books of logic—first, *Predicamentorum;* second, *Perihermenias;* third, *Analyticorum;* and so on. So, too, he did not mark these stages explicitly even though he allows for them. His usage is consistent with them, and his table of contents supposes them. *To noein, to phronein.*

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[12]"Aristotle gives no hint of regarding the judgment as the operation which grasps the existential act of the thing. . . . The existential features are entirely ignored" (Joseph Owens, C.SS.R., *The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelean Metaphysics* [Toronto, 1951], p. 258).

[13]"The apprehension . . . by which being invades the mind . . . With assent, the reverse process is initiated" (Francis M. Tyrrell, *The Role of Assent in Judgment* [Washington: Catholic Univ. Press, 1948], p. 153). This study is invaluable from a historical standpoint.

[14]". . . de hac quaestione ne quidem cogitavit" (F.-X. Maquart, *Elementa Philosophiae* [Paris: Blot, 1938], IV, 76).

[15]"In spite of exceptions, mind (*nous*) in Aristotle refers to knowledge of simple things, intellect (*dianoia*) to knowledge of composites" (Owens, *Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelean Metaphysics*, p. 405, n. 10). Personally, I still prefer the distinction between faculty and operation. But, at any rate, there is no mention of will (*boulesis*).

St. Thomas uses the a priori approach. To press the metaphor, he draws a deep breath and jumps overboard. He dives down in the same spot where Aristotle had been looking, swims under the whole problem, and comes up with a third operation, dripping analogies. He reads this third operation into Aristotle's table of contents to prove it an authentic fit. This is the point where the two approaches meet. And they both grip one truth.

St. Thomas never lines up the apprehension and judgment in the same connection as the different operations. If we were to try and

TERM OF COMPARISON	I
in grammar	words
in language	common noun
in logic	term
in mind (*verbum*)	single concept
operation	definition
mode	abstracting
unity of species	from object
derived	through phantasm
phantasm	of material object (*medium in quo*)
object	predicamental being (*ens reale*)
in response to	*Quid est?*
formal object	quiddity of a material thing
material object	*respicit ad essentiam*
principia	*incomplexa*
finality	*per ordinem ad* →
truth	matter
light of	agent intellect
determination	natural
infallibility	proper object
motion	
terminus a quo	
terminus ad quem	
senses	external senses →
sensible	proper sensible

squeeze them into the first two, it would be un-Thomistic, and what would we call the third?

According to St. Thomas, God knows all things in one infinite act of divine intelligence through one species which is His essence. The angels receive all their natural knowledge through a series of infused species.[16] Man receives his knowledge from material things. Set in a space-time continuum he must move from potency to act towards the same destiny God and the angels enjoy; that is, God Himself. This

II	III
decl. sentence	paragraph
"is" (not)	discourse
proposition	argument
(*enunciatio*)	
combination of	arrangement of
concepts	combinations
composition	inference (*ratio*)
joining and dividing	arranging
from mind	from "intention"
from previous species	"middle term"
S and *P*	
of nexus	of syllogism
(necessary condition)	(necessary condition)
logical relation	logical relation
(*ens rationis*, *S* is *P*)	(S - M - P)
An est?	*Quare?*
verum per se notum	*per aliud notum*
ad esse	*ad generationem*
	(conception)
complexa	*conclusiones*
verum	← *per resolutionem*
form	truth begets truth
nature	first principles
natural habit	habits (virtues)
1st principles, yes,	demonstration, yes
others, no	dialectics, no
quies (act ← potency)	motion
understanding consequence	
M is *P* } + premises →	knowledge (effect)
S is *M* }	↓ (motion)
S is *P* ← consequent ←	wisdom (cause)
imagination →	discursive power
common sensible →	instinct

[16]The angels do not have a second operation (cf. *ST*, I, q. 58, a. 4). They do have a Thomistic judgment (cf. *ibid.*, q. 59, a. 3).

calls for different kinds of operations in man as well as different acts.

> The human intellect must of necessity understand by composition and division. For since the intellect passes from potentiality to act, it has a likeness to things which are generated, which do not attain to perfection all at once but acquire it by degrees: so likewise the human intellect does not acquire perfect knowledge by the [1] act of apprehension; but it [1] apprehends something about its object, such as its quiddity, and this is its first and proper object; and then it [2] understands the properties, accidents, and the various relations of the essence. Thus it necessarily compares one thing with another by composition or division; and from one composition and division it proceeds to another, which is [3] the process of reasoning.[17]

There is no mention of "judgment" in the whole article. And this is the one article in the *Summa* where it should appear if it were identical with our intellect understanding by composition and division.

The formal principle of this distinction is the manner of preparing the species.[18] In his first operation man comes to the knowledge of his proper object, the quiddity of a material thing. These are all definitions of predicamental being—comprehensions, immaterial, universal essences—because they have been abstracted out of phantasms set in time and space. There is no question of an actual independent existence (*esse*) for these abstracted quiddities here.[19] So long as we are dealing with the proper object of the intellect, it operates with a dynamism which allows for no lack of determination. Hence there is no need for any intellectual habit to perfect it.[20] It is infallibly true.[21] Unfortunately, not everything can be abstracted from the phantasm of a material thing—truth, for instance.

Logical truth is a logical relation.[22] A logical entity cannot be abstracted from a material thing because a logical entity is not in a material thing. By definition it cannot exist except objectively as a

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[17]*ST*, I, q. 85, a. 5. *The "Summa Theologica" of St. Thomas Aquinas*, literally tr. by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province (2d rev. ed. 22 vols. London: Burns, Oates, & Washbourne, 1920-29). The Latin text will be repeated only when the translation is our own.

[18]*De Ver.*, q. 1, a. 5; "quomodo et quo ordine" *ST*, I, q. 84, div. art.; "de modo et ordine intelligendi" (*ibid.*, q. 85, div. art.).

[19]"Prima operatio respicit quidditatem rei; secunda respicit esse ipsius" (*In I Sent.*, d. 19, q. 5, a. 1 ad 7; cf. *In Boeth. De Trin.*, q. 5, a. 3).

[20]This is an inference drawn from *In III Sent.*, d. 23, q. 1, a. 1.

[21]". . . properly speaking, the intellect is not at fault concerning this quiddity" (*ST*, I, q. 85, a. 6).

[22]". . . veritas est relatio rationis" (*Summa Totius Logicae*, tr. 6, cap. 5).

figment of the mind. That is why we need a second operation. The only way in which the intellect can form the species of a logical relation is to combine two previously abstracted species and compare them for conformity or difformity. If P is understood to be identified with S, that is a logical relation. We must prepare some phantasm of the nexus as a necessary condition, but we cannot abstract the logical relation itself from such a phantasm. It just is not there.

In his second operation man does not come to the knowledge of any new quiddity. There is not any quiddity to a logical relation. It is not predicamental being. That is why combinations of concepts are not defined. There is no definition of a white man, still less of some propositions.[23] All we can know is whether the combination of concepts is true or not, conformable with reality, $P/S \rightarrow \frac{\text{form}}{\text{matter}}$. This would be a natural place to make a judgment but it is not the judgment itself. A question, "Is S P?," is just as much a combination as a declarative sentence, "S is P."

This prepares the way for a real advance in knowledge. The first operation told us what kind of thing the material object was, *to ti ēn einai.*[24] The second, with the help of the judgment, locates its actual existence—*respicit esse*[25]—for us, in time and space when need be. This is not any intuition of existence. It is merely the knowledge of the temporal position of this quiddity, represented by the phantasm, cosignified in the tense of the verb and situated in the suppositum. As the subject is an *ens reale* or an *ens rationis,* so too the predicate.

This second operation is necessary in its exercise with a dynamism which makes universal skepticism practically impossible. It is necessary in its specification of first principles.[26] It is subject to the influence of the will where the natural light of the agent intellect is less bright.[27] Hence the need for the intellectual habit of understanding

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[23]". . . complexa non definiuntur. Hominis enim albi non est aliqua definitio, et multo minus enunciationis alicujus" (*In I Post. Anal.*, lect. 1).

[24]*De anima* iii 6, 430b28. See *Post. Anal.* i 22, 82b38; *Metaphys.* vii 3, 1028b34.

[25]". . . prima quidem operatio respicit ipsam naturam rei . . . secunda operatio respicit ipsum esse rei" (*In Boeth. De Trin.*, q. 5, a. 3; cf. *In I Sent.*, d. 19, q. 5, a. 1 ad 7).

[26]"If, therefore, that which the reason apprehends is such that it naturally assents thereto, e.g., the first principles, it is not in our power to assent or dissent to the like: assent follows naturally, and consequently, properly speaking, is not subject to our command" (*ST*, I-II, q. 17, a. 6).

[27]"But some things which are apprehended do not convince the intellect to such an extent as not to leave it free to assent or dissent, or at least suspend its assent or dissent, on account of some cause or other; and in such things assent or dissent is in our power, and is subject to our command" (*ibid.*).

to protect it against error. The second operation groups the matter which was already supplied by two acts of the first. It takes us along

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→ Via inventionis—secundum quam proceditur ad agnitionem

phantasm — intellectus

agens

quo ordine — 1o

quo modo — abstractione

Quid est? — totum / intel. / pos. — verbum

ex sensu in memoriam,

ex memoria in experimentum,

ex experimento in prima principia

An est?

thesaurus specierum

memorativarum in

loco formarum

Ulterius inquirendo ex istis principiis

Quare? $2^3 = \sqrt[3]{512}$ — principle of identity $2^3 = \sqrt[3]{512}$

ex simplici inspectione primorum principiorum

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[28]"Ergo Deum esse, non est per se notum" (*ST*, I, q. 2, a. 1 sed contra).

[29]". . . quod preexistunt in nobis quaedam scientiarum semina, scilicet primae conceptiones intellectus . . . sive sint complexa, ut dignitates,

the road so far as the comparison of terms can bring us. It does not, for example, bring us to the knowledge of the existence of God.[28]

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necessariorum et aeternorum,[29]

2o compositione

3o discursu

quae statim notis terminis cognoscuntur;

et hunc processum perficit intellectus, [1]

qui est habitus principiorum.

totum est { majus / sua / parte }

verbum

in conclusiones — scientia [2]

lumine primorum principiorum

$2^3 = 2 \times 2 \times 2$

$2 \times 2 \times 2 = 8$

$8 = \sqrt[3]{8 \times 8 \times 8}$

$\sqrt[3]{8 \times 8 \times 8} = \sqrt[3]{512}$

2 $\sqrt[3]{512}$

et altissimarum causarum homo de inferioribus judicet — sapientia [3]

via judicii

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sive incomplexa, sicut ratio entis, et unus et hujusmodi," (*De Ver.*, q. 11, a. 1; cf. *CG*, I, cap. 59).

Aristotle never arrived at the explicit formulation of a third operation because he did not realize the need for it. Man is destined to come to the knowledge of the existence of God. And first principles are not enough. Hence the need for a third operation wherein truth can beget new truth. Man must move from the knowledge of the visible things of this world to the invisible things of God.[30] And nature is never lacking in the means necessary to its end.[31]

In his third operation man moves from the known to the unknown, from first principles to demonstrated truths. The first operation answered the question, What is it? The second, What sort of an existence does it have? The third, Why? When the species cannot be abstracted from a phantasm or constructed by a mere comparison of terms, it may still be prepared by a discourse running through the steps of a syllogism. Where the natural light of the agent intellect grows dim, that light can still be strengthened by concentrating it through the focus of first principles.

The dynamism of the third operation is evident in all forms of intellectual curiosity, notably in children. It marks the specific difference which makes man a rational animal. Like every other natural act within a certain range, it never fails.[32] The intellectual virtues of knowledge (*scientia*) and wisdom (*sapientia*) in the third operation are just as infallible as the fall of a stone towards the center of the earth, and just as necessary; for example, the demonstrative syllogism of the *pars judicativa in logic*.[33] Within a wider range the movement of this operation is susceptible to the influence of the will in its specification. Normally it gives birth to a good opinion; for example, the dialectical syllogism in the *pars inventiva*.[34] But every once in a while it comes forth with a little monster; for example, the fallacy in the *pars sophistica*.[35]

The third operation is both the effect and the cause of a second.[36] The syllogism is the effect, first, insomuch as it receives its proximate

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[30]Rom. 1:20.

[31]*ST*, I, q. 78, a. 4; see *In III De Anima*, lect. 14 (Pirotta no. 811) et passim.

[32]"In some things, nature acts from necessity in such a way that it cannot fail" (*In I Post. Anal.*, lect. 1).

[33]". . . because there is judgment with the certitude of science" (*ibid.*).

[34]"But there is not always certitude with invention" (*ibid.*).

[35]"The part of logic called sophistic is devoted to the third way of reasoning (in which reason falls away from what is true because of a defect in some principle that should have been observed in reasoning)" (*ibid.*).

[36]". . . unde ratio incipit semper ab intellectu, et ad intellectum terminatur. Unde patet quod ratiocinari et intelligere differunt sicut moveri et quiescere" (*De Potentiis Animae*, cap. 6 ad finem).

matter—the premises (*principia complexa*)—from the second, just as it receives its remote matter—the terms (*principia incomplexa*)—from the first.[37] It is also the effect of the second insomuch as it receives its form, the consequence—for instance, the principle of identity—from the second. It is the cause of a second insomuch as the second formulates the conclusion, *S* is *P*, seen in the reflected light or judgment of the third, $\frac{\begin{matrix} M-P \\ S-M \end{matrix}}{S-P}$ with the *M* left out. If we had enough intellectual light to see the relationship between 2^3 and $\sqrt{64}$ directly, we would not have to resolve it into first principles by means of a middle term; for example, $2^3 = 2 \times 2 \times 2 = 8 = \sqrt{64}$.

The operations play a major role in St. Thomas's synthesis. It is a role, however, which is exclusively confined to the preparation of the intelligible species. The three different operations are all generically the same.[38] They are all the reduction of an intellect-in-potency to an intellect-in-act. They differ only according to the different manner whereby the intelligible species which informs that passive intellect is prepared. The first merely supplies raw material to be compared in the second. The third is to the second as motion is to rest. It is the same power—for example, gravity—which moves a body out of one position and holds it in place after it arrives at another. Likewise, it is only one faculty of the intellect and one genus of *verbum,* no matter how one of its principles, the intelligible species, happens to be prepared.[39] It is this concept or mental word, the term of the operation, which we are now going to consider as serving the function of an apprehension, an intention, a deliberation, or a judgment.[40]

II

STAGES IN THE INTELLECT

Aristotle, as was mentioned above, does not seem to have exploited the distinction among the different stages, functions, or processes in intellection. "To judge, *to krinein,* is the genus of 'to perceive,' *tou*

[37] *In III Sent.*, d. 34, q. 1, a. 2.

[38] ". . . secundum nullam differentiam entis potest diversificari potentia intellectiva apprehensiva" (*De Potentiis Animae,* cap. 6).

[39] ". . . per eandem potentiam movetur aliquid ad locum et quiescit in loco . . ." (*ibid.*).

[40] *In I Periherm.*, lect. 1.

aisthanesthai."[41] We should not be surprised to find Aristotle using this judgment of sense cognition as well as of the different operations of the intellect even as of the civil claims of a law court. St. Thomas interprets him as associating the wise man with judgment. "Now the intellect as judging is said to have wisdom, *to phronein*: whilst as apprehending it is said to understand, *to noein.*"[42] All Aristotle had said, however, in the classic source was *epitattein*,[43] which the Ancient Version rendered as *ordinare* and the Recent as *ut praecipiat*. It looks as though St. Thomas supplied the *judicare* himself. He groups the Philosopher's *Topica, Rhetorica,* and *Poetica* into the *pars inventiva* of logic and the *Prior* and *Posterior Analytica* into the *pars judicativa.*[44] But, then, St. Thomas could read all the rules for grammar complete into the language of the most illiterate rustic, who didn't even know he was talking prose.

So long as Aristotle was having trouble with a participated agent intellect, I do not think we should expect him to keep the principles of his intellectual acts distinguished from their functions. After all, with the substance of the soul itself at stake at its base, these functional accidents of an operation, of a habit, of a faculty, of the soul itself, did not rate a very thorough investigation. St. Thomas credits Boethius with the distinction between invention and judgment,[45] and St. John Damascene with that between the apprehension, the intention, the deliberation, and the judgment.

> All those acts which Damascene enumerates belong to one power—namely, the intellectual power. For this power first of all only apprehends something; and this act is called intelligence. Secondly, it directs what it apprehends to the knowledge of something else, or to some operation; and this is called intention. And when it goes on in search of what it intends, it is called [*excogitatio*] invention. When by reference to something known for certain, it examines what it has found, it is said to know or to be wise, which belongs to *phronesis* or wisdom; for it belongs to the wise man to judge, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. i. 2). And when once it has obtained something for certain, as being fully examined, it thinks about the means of making it known to others; and this is the ordering of interior speech, from which proceeds external speech. For every difference of acts does not make the powers

[41] *Topica* ii 4, 111a19.
[42] *In III De Anima,* lect. 4 (Pirotta no. 629).
[43] *Metaphys.* i 2, 982a19.
[44] *In I Periherm.*, lect. 1.
[45] ". . . nam logica, ut Boetius in sua *Topica* dicit, duas habet parties: scilicet inventivam et judicativam" (*Summa Totius Logicae,* tr. 7, cap. 1).

vary, but only what cannot be reduced to the one same principle, as we have said above (Q. LXXVIII., A. 4).[46]

Knowledge is a complex operation, fully as complex as taking a step. Hence, we should not be surprised at a series of detailed analogies, any more than at an anatomical diagnosis of the elements involved. In the process of placing one foot before the other, there is (1) an apprehension in the mind to be distinguished from (2) the intention, (3) the telegraph message sent down through the neural synapses, (4) the muscular impulse, and (5) the co-ordination of the limbs. The classic analogy for knowledge is, of course, conception with (1) the apprehension of the sperm, (2) the fertilization of the ovum, (3) the months of labor, (4) the pangs of childbirth, (5) the *proles* or concept.

Another analogy is (1) picking up food with the hand, (2) eating it, (3) digesting it, (4) assimilating it (5) into one's own substance. Here it is the analogy of a trial court. (1) A policeman apprehends the prisoner. (2) A sergeant books him on charges. (3) A jury weighs the evidence adduced by the prosecution and defense attorneys. (4) A judge passes sentence. (5) Doors open or close giving expression to his disposal of the case. These are all human acts. Hitherto we have been considering their principles. Now we are interested in their function.

A

THE APPREHENSION

Not every notion which enters the mind goes through this whole series of stages, any more than every mental apprehension is realized in a kick, every intercourse in a child, every bit of roughage into a muscle, or every arrest into a full-dress court procedure. But every cognitive act is, first of all, an apprehension. The new form must be grasped—taken, as it were, by the hand—even if it never gets any further. It does not matter how this apprehension takes place—by the first, second, or third operation—of the mind, any more than it matters whether a prisoner be arrested by the strong right arm of a patrolman, by the summons of a moral force exerted through the intellect as in the subpoena of a process server, or after the investigation of a conspiracy by the FBI. What is essential is that some form be apprehended as a species that can be assimilated in the cognitive faculty. Otherwise,

[46]*ST*, I, q. 79, a. 10 ad 3; cf. *De Intellectu et Intelligibili.*

there is no knowledge. We cannot know without knowing something.

"For to understand [*intelligere*] is simply to apprehend an intelligible truth."[47] The title *pars apprehensiva* belongs onomastically to the cognitive faculties of the soul as opposed to the *pars appetitiva.*[48] We apprehend material things with our senses—*apprehensione sensitiva;*[49] definitions, with the first operation of the intellect—*apprehendit essentiam uniuscujusque rei;*[50] self-evident principles, with the second—*in secunda vero operatione . . . apprehendere veritatem est apprehendere conformitatem . . .;*[51] conclusions, with the third—*per inquisitionem rationis, apprehensionem veritatis intelligibilis consequuntur.*[52]

St. Thomas never says the first operation is an apprehension as though the two were equivalent. They are not convertible. He could not say the apprehension is the first operation. Every operation requires an apprehension. It is the object of this apprehension which differentiates the first, second, and third; that is, *quidditates indivisibilium, compositionem, discursum.* Usually, the note of apprehension shows up *in obliquo,* carried by a verb, as, "One is called the understanding of indivisible things, by which the intellect apprehends the essence of each thing in itself."[53]

B

THE INTENTION

Intent and *intense* are etymological doublets. *Intense* kept the original physical meaning of a stretching, tension towards something. *Intent* developed the mental connotation of a purpose or signification of something.[54]

St. Thomas needed this *intentio* as a signification of something to distinguish the conscious attention of actual knowledge from the

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[47]*ST*, I, q. 79, a. 8; cf. *CG*, IV, cap. 11.

[48]". . . the apprehensive power is not drawn to a thing, as it is in itself; but knows it by reason of an *intention* of the thing, which *intention* it has in itself, or receives in its own way" (*ST*, I-II, q. 22, a. 2).

[49]*Ibid.*, a. 3; q. 31, a. 1; q. 77, a. 1 et passim.

[50]*In I Periherm.*, lect. 1.

[51]*Summa Totius Logicae*, tr. 6, cap. 5.

[52]*In III De Anima*, lect. 4 (Pirotta no. 631). Cf. "a bono apprehenso per rationem" (*ST*, I-II, q. 10, a. 3 ad 3); "ideo hominis apprehensio ratio dicitur" (*In III Sent.*, d. 35, q. 2, a. 2, qa. 1); "apprehensio *rationis*" (*ST*, I-II, q. 77, a. 1).

[53]*In I Periherm.*, lect. 1.

[54]*O.E.D.*, s.v.

habitual subconscious retention of the species.[55] This is, of course, important in the overtones delight[56] and sorrow[57] have in the soul, and, most important, in the prayer of rapture.[58] He needed it to focus attention on the configuration of color which is found in the object,[59] in the air as its medium,[60] as well as in the pupil of the eye itself.[61] He needed it to distinguish between the first intention of the direct universal—that is, the nature as it is in Peter—from the second intention of the reflex—that is, as it is in the species of humanity.[62] These are *intentiones logicae*,[63] *intentiones universalitatis*,[64] the subject matter of science and philosophy. *Intentio sumitur pro ratione quam significat definitio.*[65]

The Thomistic intention "directs what it apprehends to the knowledge of something else."[66] It is to the apprehension what the final cause is to the formal;[67] to the species, what a term is to its principle;[68] to the *Verbum Divinum*, what procession is in the human intellect compared to that in the Blessed Trinity.[69]

C

THE DELIBERATION

Cogitation is not obsolete, but it is hardly in good philosophical standing. The etymological derivation from *co-agitare vel simul agitare*[70] brings out the notion of an agitation going on in the mind with

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[55]". . . in operibus animae requiritur quaedam intensio" (*ST*, I-II, q. 77, a. 1; cf. *CG*, I, cap. 55).

[56]*ST*, I-II, q. 33, a. 3.

[57]*Ibid.*, q. 38, a. 2.

[58]*De Ver.*, q. 13, a. 3.

[59]*ST*, I-II, q. 22, a. 2, ad 3.

[60]*Ibid.*, q. 37, a. 4, ob. 1.

[61]*ST*, I, q. 78, a. 3; I-II, q. 5, a. 6 ad 2. Cf.: "intentio existens in imaginatione" (*In IV Sent.*, d. 44, q. 2, a. 1 qa. 3).

[62]*Summa Totius Logicae*, tr. 1, cap. 1.

[63]*De Ente*, proem.; *ST*, I, q. 76, a. 3 ad 4 et passim.

[64]*ST*, I, q. 85, a. 2 ad 2; I-II, q. 29, a. 6 et passim.

[65]*De Ver.*, q. 21, a. 3 ad 5.

[66]*ST*, I, q. 79, a. 10 ad 3.

[67]*Ibid.*

[68]"Now this understood intention, since it is the term, so to speak, of the intellectual operation, is distinct from the intelligible species which makes the intellect in act, and which we must look upon as the principle of the intellectual operation; albeit each is an image of the object understood" (*CG*, I, cap. 53).

[69]"Hence as in God to be is to understand, the intelligible species in Him is His act of understanding" (*ibid.*, IV, cap. 11).

[70]". . . dicitur enim cogitare, quasi coagitare, vel simul agitare" (*ST*, II-II, q. 2, a. 1, ob. 1).

scraps of evidence rubbing up against one another and clamoring for a hearing. It implies a deliberation, a weighing in the balance, a mulling over in the mind.

> According to Richard of St. Victor *cogitation* would seem to regard the consideration of the many things from which a person intends to gather one simple truth. Hence cogitation may comprise not only the perceptions of the senses in taking cognizance of certain effects, but also the imaginations, and again the reason's discussion of the various signs or of anything that conduces to the truth in view.[71]

This notion of deliberation, *inventio,* discovery, is scarcely brought out by our English word "thought" for *excogitatio.* Excogitation implies a discourse or reasoning process proper to the third operation in the intellect. We could not have this comparison of comparisons in the first or the second. In the third, however, it is known as the *pars inventiva* and includes the lyric impressions of poetry, the suspicions insinuated by rhetoric, the opinions proper to probable reasoning, and the dialectical syllogism in the *Topica.*[72] It persists in the intellect despite the firmness of an assent commanded and held captive by the will in faith.[73] When it is successful in resolving its problem into the terms of the proper object of the intellect—for example $2^3 = 2 \times 2 \times 2 = 8 = \sqrt[3]{8 \times 8 \times 8} = \sqrt[3]{512}$—then we have the *pars judicativa* with its certitude of knowledge, *cum certitudine scientiae.*[74]

The intention and the deliberation have been neglected in modern epistemology, I think, because we have been uncertain about the function of judgment. When we do not know where we are going, the way stations are not so important.

D

THE JUDGMENT

The first three steps might be telescoped under the function of discovery, the *pars inventiva.*[75] The *pars judicativa* reverses the *processus* and resolves the forms presented into the terms of the prop-

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[71]*ST*, II-II, q. 180, a. 3 ad 1; cf. *In III Sent.*, d. 23, q. 2, a. 2, ob. 2.
[72]*In I Post. Anal.*, lect. 1.
[73]*ST*, II-II, q. 2, a. 1; cf. *In III Sent.*, d. 23, q. 2, a. 2, qa. 1; *De Ver.*, q. 14, a. 1.
[74]*In I Post. Anal.*, lect. 1.
[75]*Ibid.* Cf. *De Potentiis Animae*, cap. 6 ad finem; T. Spencer, *Logick*, 1628, p. 149; J. Kleutgen, S.J., *Ars Dicendi* (Marietti, 1908), IV, 1.

er object of the intellect. It passes judgment on the work of the *pars inventiva,* whether the deliberation was successful or not in analyzing and resolving the problem into the terms of its own proper object. This point cannot be emphasized too much. The human intellect does not judge S is P. It may apprehend it. It may judge that P/S is the proper object of the intellect, and that $\frac{P}{S}$ accordingly corresponds to objective reality $\frac{\text{form}}{\text{matter}}$.

This *judicium* is not a common expression in St. Thomas. It is nowhere nearly so common as *the second operation.* It does not occur at all in that article in the *Summa* which deals with the second operation of the intellect.[76] It occurs in only one context in that whole treatise; that is, in the loss of that proper object in the problem of error. We have no right, therefore, on a priori grounds to look for some new and foreign meaning in a term which otherwise manifests a characteristic logical evolution.

St. Thomas seems to maintain a consistent courtroom connotation in his use of the word. According to him, *judicium* is the act of a judge acting precisely inasmuch as he is a judge (*judex* from *jus* and *dicere*) asserting a right. But right is the object of justice.[77] "The word *judgment* from its original [meaning of a right] decision about what is just has been extended to signify a right decision in any matter whether speculative [that is, as regards truth] or practical. Now a right judgment in any matter requires two things"[78]—

1) *ratio*—in the third operation of the intellect
2) disposition of justice in matters of justice (conflict of rights)
   fortitude in matters of fortitude (cowardice *versus* foolhardiness)
   wisdom in matters of truth through highest causes
   speculative intellect
   knowledge in matters of truth through—causes
   prudence in matters of contingent truth
   practical

Now, the measure of justice with which we are concerned here is the conformity of a cognitive faculty with its object. St. Thomas does not judge the difference between one form and another, S is P, $2^3 = \sqrt[3]{512}$. His *judicium* determines whether or not any particular combination of forms can be resolved into the proper object of the faculty. That is

[76] *ST*, I, q. 85, a. 5.
[77] *Ibid.*, II-II, q. 60, a. 1.
[78] *Ibid.*, ad 1; I-II, q. 93, a. 2 ad 3. Cf. *De Ver.*, q. 8, a. 1 ad 13.

the only point of law or question of right in his judgment of truth, "quando incipit judicare de re apprehensa."[79]

> With regard to the "apprehension" of these [existing habits], our information concerning them should be taken from their objects and their acts, [since] they cannot be apprehended directly in their essence . . .
> "Judgment," however, is made concerning everything according to that which is the measure of it. Now the certain measure of each habit is that [object] to which that habit is ordered. And this [ordination] may come to our knowledge in three ways, from sense . . . from the natural light of reason . . . from supernatural grace.[80]

The judgment of sense is, of course, made with the certitude of natural tendency.[81] God, who has made the stone to fall towards the center of the earth, the needle to point towards the magnetic north, electrons to flow towards a positive pole, has also made my eye proportioned for color, my common sense for a combination of proper sensibles, my phantasm as a tool for my intellect, my discursive power much like that of the brute. There is no second operation in sense; "sensus non componit vel dividit."[82] But there are plenty of judgments, far more than there are in the intellect. ". . . tam sentiendo quam intelligendo anima judicat";[83] ". . . gustus . . . judicat amara . . ."[84] "The proper sense judges of the proper sensible . . . Wherefore, the discerning judgment must be assigned to the common sense."[85]

> . . . intellect, imagination or sense, to which faculties judgment belongs. . . . Further, certain things lack liberty of judgment, either because they have no judgment at all, as

[79] *De Ver.*, q. 1, a. 3.

[80] "Secundum apprehensionem quidem oportet quod eorum motitia ex obiectis et actibus capiatur; nec ipsi possunt per essentiam suam apprehendi. . . . Judicium autem de unoquoque habetur secundum illud quod est mensura illius. Cuiuslibet autem habitus mensura quaedam est id ad quod habitus ordinatur, quod quidem ad nostram cognitionem se habet tripliciter. Quandoque enim est a sensu acceptum . . . quandoque vero est naturali cognitioni inditum . . . quandoque vero est divinitus infusum . . ." (*De Ver.*, q. 10, a. 9).

[81] ". . . because it judges not from reason, but from natural instinct. And the same thing is to be said of any judgment of brute animals" (*ST*, I, q. 83, a. 1).

[82] *In I Periherm.*, lect. 3.

[83] *In III De Anima*, lect. 4 (Pirotta no. 616).

[84] *ST*, I, q. 85, a. 6.

[85] *Ibid.*, q. 78, a. 4 ad 2; q. 17, a. 2; *In III De Anima*, lect. 3 (Pirotta no. 613).

> plants and stones; or because they have a judgment determined by nature to one thing, as irrational animals, for the sheep by its natural estimate judges the wolf to be harmful to it, and as a result of this judgment flies from the wolf; and the same applies to others.[86]

St. Thomas uses this same example in proving free will in the angels: just as an arrow moves to its mark without any self-determination; and just as a sheep flees the wolf, determined by a judgment which is not free but instinctive; so, too, intellectual natures are able to determine themselves because they are free in their judgment, *judicio libero*.[87] It would not have been like St. Thomas to have shifted meanings for a term in the middle of an argument.

Judgment is a univocal term, then, in animal, human, and angelic cognition. It is a genus which is specified by its object. The source of the judgment in the first operation of the intellect is the same as that of the senses. It is an endowment of our nature; hence, necessary in its specification and infallible.

> The reason for this is evident; for every faculty, as such, is per se directed to its proper object; and things of this kind are always the same. Hence, so long as the faculty exists, its judgment concerning its own proper object does not fail. Now the proper object of the intellect is the quiddity of a material thing; and hence, properly speaking, the intellect is not at fault concerning the quiddity . . .[88]

Just as instinct is the guarantee for our sense judgment *per modum inclinationis*,[89] so the intellectual virtues are necessary to determine the intellectual judgment of truth *per modum cognitionis*. The first operation of the intellect is fully determined to its object—the quiddity

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[86]*CG*, II, cap. 48.

[87]*Ibid.* See *ST*, I, q. 59, a. 3.

[88]*ST*, I, q. 85, a. 6.

[89]". . . judicium . . . a natura inditum" (*ST*, I, q. 59, a. 3; cf. q. 83, a. 1 [n. 81 above]). In order to show that the *judicium sensus* is not loose usage, confer these parts of *In III De Anima:* ". . . sensus non deficiunt a vero judicio propriorum sensibilium, nisi in minori parte, propter aliquam corruptionem organi" (cap. 6 [Pirotta no. 661]); ". . . anima judicat potentia sensitiva calidum et frigidum, et alia hujusmodi" (cap. 8 [Pirotta no. 711]); ". . . visus non semper verus est in judicando de his quae sunt adjuncta proprio objecto" (cap. 11 [Pirotta no. 762]); ". . . quando est solum sentire, idest apprehendere et judicare secundum sensum . . . simplex apprehensio et judicium sensus assimilatur speculationi intellectus. . . . sensus dijudicans haec duo erat unum subjecto, differens ratione" (cap. 12 [Pirotta nos. 767 and 776]). For a discussion of this "judgment," see George P. Klubertanz, S.J., *The Discursive Power* (Saint Louis: THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN, 1952), pp. 233-37.

of a material thing—by its intelligible species. This species is prepared by the natural light of the agent intellect illuminating, elevating, and abstracting this species from the phantasm. Accordingly, there is no need, occasion, or room for any further determination, such as in that of a habit. The second operation, however, which has for its object self-evident truth, is perfected by the virtue of understanding. The third operation, which has for its object truth known through the medium of a middle term, is perfected by knowledge and wisdom in necessary matter, by counsel and prudence in contingent.

VIA INVENTIVA	VIA JUDICII[90]
	contemplatio in cognitione speculativa
KNOWLEDGE	WISDOM
	ex simplici inspectione primorum principiorum et altissimarum causarum
in conclusiones ex istis principiis	
UNDERSTANDING	
ex experimento in prima principia	
ex memoria in experimentum	
ex sensu in memoriam	
	cognitio practica quae dirigit in operibus moralibus
CONSILIUM	PRUDENCE
inquirendo et conjecturando ex his quae solent accidere	judicet probabiliter quod fit per gnomen et synesim

". . . judicium est quasi conclusio et determinatio consilii."[91]

1st operation—understanding of individual concepts in *Categories*[92]

2nd operation—composition and division, truth and falsity *Interpretation*

3rd operation—reasoning from one proposition to another in rest of logic

pars judicativa—demonstrative syllogism in *Priora Analytica*

infallible process in *Posteriora Analytica*

pars inventiva—dialectical syllogism —opinion in *Topica*

—suspicion in *Rhetoric*

—impression in *Poetry*

pars sophistica—sophistical syllogism—fallacies in *Elenchorum*

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[90]*De Ver.*, q. 15, a. 1 ad 4.
[91]I Cor., 6:5.
[92]*In III Sent.*, d. 34, q. 1, a. 2; cf. *ST*, I-II, q. 68, a. 4.

It is in this third operation that rational judgment *per modum cognitionis* really belongs. *Judicium in nobis ut communiter fit per resolutionem in principia.*[93] After all the evidence has been accumulated in the apprehension, directed in the intention, and sifted in the deliberation, the induction of the *via inventiva* gives way to the deduction of the *via judicativa* analyzing and resolving that evidence into the terms of the proper object of the faculty. It is the prerogative of the man of wisdom to pass judgment on necessary matter, of the man of prudence on contingent affairs. This is the common understanding of judgment. "Sic non est inter vos sapiens quis qui possit judicare inter fratres suos?"[94] It is restricted to a very few contexts.

The second operation of the intellect seems to be the only operation in any cognitive faculty in which a correct Thomistic judgment does not take place. It is formulated here, but formed elsewhere, just as the conclusion of a syllogism may be expressed in a second operation although the syllogism itself belongs to the third. There does not seem to be any reason why the second should not have a judgment of its own, except for one more or less extrinsic consideration. There does not seem to be anything to judge there. Necessary matter in the second operation would correspond to self-evident principles. But St. Thomas does not judge first principles; he apprehends them. He accepts them as a gift with the virtue of understanding and refers other matters, both necessary and contingent, for judgment in the third.

> Understanding seems to denominate the simple apprehension; but wisdom is the name for a certain fullness of certitude in judging that which was apprehended: and so understanding seems to pertain to the way of discovery, but wisdom to the way of judgment.[95]

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[93]*ST*, I, q. 83, a. 3 ad 2.

[94]*In I Post. Anal.*, lect. 1.

[95]". . . intellectus videtur nominare simplicem apprehensionem; sed sapientia nominat quandam plenitudinem certitudinis ad judicandum de apprehensis: et ideo intellectus videtur pertinere ad viam inventionis, sed sapientia ad viam judicii" (*In III Sent.*, d. 35, q. 2, a. 2, qa. 3). Cf.: "Now just as research [*inquisitio*] belongs to reason, so judgment belongs to the intellect. Wherefore in speculative matters a demonstrative science is said to exercise judgment, in so far as it judges the truth of the results of research by tracing those results back to the first indemonstrable principles. Hence thought [*consideratio*] pertains chiefly to judgment; and consequently the lack of right judgment belongs to the vice of thoughtlessness, in so far, to wit, as one fails to judge rightly through contempt or neglect of those things on which a right judgment depends" (*ST*, II-II, q. 53, a. 4). Cf. also: "The gift of understanding is related to both kinds of knowledge, viz., speculative and practical, not as to the judgment, but as to the apprehension, by grasping what is said" (*ibid.*, q. 8, a. 6 ad 3).

> Now the intellect as judging is said to have wisdom, whereas as apprehending it is said to understand.[96]
> But understanding means here an infallible, immediate and intuitive grasp [*apprehensione*] of such intelligible objects as the first principles of knowledge.[97]
> . . . to be wise pertains to intellectual judgment, to understand pertains to intellectual apprehension.[98]
> In secunda vero operatione intellectus est perfecte et completive veritas objectiva: nam apprehendere veritatem est apprehendere conformitatem rei intellectae ad se ipsum secundum suam naturam, ut dictum est.[99]

The reason why St. Thomas does not pronounce judgment on first principles is revealing. It brings us back to his consistent courtroom connotation of the term. We do not judge our superiors; at least, we ought not. That would be a *judicium usurpatum.*[100] All jurisdiction comes from above. St. Thomas judges only *de inferioribus,*[101] by means of first principles, not the first principles themselves. The first truth is God, whether He stands revealed in first principles or in the beatific vision. St. Thomas calls these first principles, *dignitates, axiomata,* axioms.[102]

> The truth by which the soul passes judgment on all things is the first truth; for just as from the truth of the divine intellect there flow into the angelic intellects those intelligible species by which the angels know all things, so does the truth of the first principles by which we judge everything proceed from the truth of the divine intellect as from its exemplary cause.[103]

So much for necessary matter. But St. Thomas does not seem to judge contingent matter in the second operation either.

> Truth follows the operation of the intellect inasmuch as it belongs to the intellect to judge about a thing as it is. And truth is known by the intellect in view of the fact that the intellect reflects upon its own act—not merely as knowing its own act, but as knowing the proportion of its act to the thing.

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[96]*In III De Anima,* cap. 4 (Pirotta no. 629).
[97]*Ibid.,* cap. 5 (Pirotta no. 639).
[98]*Ibid.,* cap. 7 (Pirotta no. 672); cf. *De Ver.,* q. 15, a. 1.
[99]*Summa Totius Logicae,* tr. 6, cap. 5.
[100]*ST,* II-II, q. 60, a. 2.
[101]*In III Sent.,* d. 35, q. 2, a. 1, qa. 2; ". . . judicium autem per altiorem causam de inferioribus habeatur" (*ST,* I, q. 1, a. 6); ". . . et Augustinus in lib. 'De vera relig.' . . . cap. xxxi: 'Veritas est secundum quam de inferioribus judicamus'" (*De Ver.,* q. 1, a. 1).
[102]*ST,* I-II, q. 94, a. 2; *De Ver.,* q. 11, a. 1.
[103]*De Ver.,* q. 1, a. 4 ad 5 (tr. by Robert W. Mulligan, S.J., *Truth* QQ. 1-9 [Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1952]).

> Now, this proportion cannot be known without knowing the nature of the act; and the nature of the act cannot be known without knowing the nature of the active principle; that is, the intellect itself, to whose nature it belongs to be conformed to things. Consequently, it is because the intellect reflects upon itself that it knows truth.[104]

We have Father Hoenen, S.J., to thank for reviving interest in Father Charles Boyer's article on this text in which he points up the reason for our assurance $\frac{P}{S} \rightarrow \frac{\text{form}}{\text{matter}}$. There is no question here of any "comparison of the content of the apprehension with the thing,"[105] but of a reflection on the finality involved. This reflection, however, seems to imply a deliberation or *excogitationem* on the object, act, faculty, and soul itself. This requires a third operation. Hence, there does not seem to be any occasion for a prudent judgment concerning contingent matter in the second operation, either.

Exceptions to this localization of the human judgment *per modum cognitionis* are more apparent than real. For instance, in setting up an elaborate proportion in order to distinguish between the *vis cogitativa* and the *ratio particularis* regarding singulars, St. Thomas compares them to their opposite numbers in the intellect regarding universals.

Vis cogitativa : intellectus :: ratio particularis : discursus rationis[106]

$$\frac{\text{Intellectus}}{\text{vis cogitativa}} :: \frac{\text{judicium absolutum de primis principiis (universalibus)}}{\text{judicium absolutum de singularibus}}$$

$$\frac{\text{Discursus rationis}}{\text{ratio particularis}} :: \frac{\text{de principibus in conclusiones}}{\text{discurrere ab uno in aliud}}$$

I think St. Thomas is deliberately sacrificing a subtle point of usage here for the sake of clarity and systematization. The reason why he does not judge first principles is altogether extrinsic to the contrast between "intellect : universals : : sense : singulars."

Practically all of the "difficult" passages are in his Commentaries on Aristotle. And this includes article 2, question 16 of the first part of the *Summa,* where St. Thomas is merely following Aristotle's thesis that truth resides only in the intellect composing and dividing. The full Thomistic doctrine, I believe, would read something like this: Logical truth resides in the second operation of the intellect, $\frac{P}{S} \rightarrow \frac{\text{form}}{\text{matter}}$.

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[104]*Ibid.*, q. 1, a. 9.

[105]Peter Hoenen, S.J., *Reality and Judgment according to St. Thomas*, tr. by Henry F. Tiblier, S.J. (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1952), p. 150.

[106]*In VI Eth.*, lect. 9.

It is judged when need be in the third. Both a second operation and a judgment are necessary for the possession of logical truth.

St. Thomas, however, as usual, leaned over backwards to save the Philosopher with a benevolent interpretation. Aristotle did not know ontological truth.[107] He did not recognize a third operation.[108] He never seems to have made a clear distinction between the apprehension of a form and the judgment of a proper object.[109] St. Thomas chooses to ignore all these limitations.[110] What St. Thomas says here is true, but it is not the whole truth. He calls the same sentence both a judgment and a second operation, much as we might call money "salary" or "rent," or a hot, white material "soft" and "sweet." This does not mean that whiteness is sweetness or that the judgment is the second operation of the mind, and much less that the second operation of the intellect is the judgment.

The second operation and the judgment are two intruments in achieving truth, one by the elaboration of the species, S is P, the other by the reference of the *verbum* to its proper object, $\frac{P}{S} \rightarrow \frac{\text{form}}{\text{matter}}$. This fine nuance of function is brought out in ". . . componendo et dividendo per suum judicium."[111] This is not a pleonasm. It is a delicate distinction between "a peculiar use of the Gerund which is employed to translate a Present or Aorist Participle of the Greek,"[112] and an ecclesiastical Latin use of *per* with the accusative, "representing the Greek *dia* with the genitive."[113] St. Thomas was not tautologous. St. Thomas was bringing out two different kinds of instrumental causality in two different moments of one integral act, using the gerund for the motion involved in the human operation and *per* with the accusative for the principle of any *actus perfectus*.

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[107]"It must be known, however, that the Philosopher speaks of truth here according as it pertains to the human intellect" (*In I Periherm.*, lect. 3).

[108]*Ibid.*, lect. 1.

[109]"To make matters worse, a precise and neutral term for 'judgment' was also wanting" (Leo W. Keeler, S.J., *The Problem of Error* [Rome, 1934], p. 23).

[110]Cf. *ST*, I, q. 16, a. 2 and parallel passages of later works.

[111]*In I Periherm.*, lect. 3. Elsewhere, St. Thomas points out it is not the second operation so much as the judgment which is the important element in truth. ". . . truth in the intellect belongs to that which the intellect asserts, not to the operation whereby it asserts" (*CG*, I, cap. 59).

[112]H. P. V. Nunn, *An Introduction to Ecclesiastical Latin*, (Eton, 1951), p. 93, no. 188. This is the standard Thomistic expression for the operations; for example, ". . . quando judicat . . . tunc primo cognoscit et dicit verum, et hoc facit componendo et dividendo" (*ST*, I, q. 16, a. 2 et passim).

[113]Nunn, *Introduction to Ecclesiastical Latin*, p. 108, no. 227.

SUMMARY

Judicium autem perfectum de re aliqua dari non potest, nisi ea omnia [WAY of discovery] [PROPER OBJECT] quae ad rem pertinent, cognoscantur; et praecipue, si ignoretur id, quod est terminus, et finis judicii (*ST,* I, q. 84, a. 8).

JUDICIUM, -i, n., fr. *jus dicens,* actum judicis inquantum judex est (*ibid.,* II-II, q. 60, q. 60, a. 1). Judicium nihil aliud est quam quaedam definitio, vel determinatio eius quod justum est (*ibid.,* a. 5). Judicium autem de unoquoque habetur secundum illud quod est mensura illius. Cujuslibet autem habitus mensura quaedam est id ad quod habitus ordinatur (*De Ver.,* q. 10, a. 9).

(A) *re proper object of faculty* a) *per modum inclinationis,*—instinctus

b) *per modum cognitionis,* —sapientiae

(B) *re practical decision;* for instance, in law court. prudentiae

nomen judicii, quod secundam primam impositionem significat rectam determinationem justorum, ampliatum est ad significandam rectam determinationem in quibuscumque rebus, [A] tam in speculativis,

[B] quam in practicis (*ST,* II-II, q. 60, a. 1 ad 1)

judicare de aliquo potest intelligi dupliciter:

[A] uno modo, sicut vis cognitiva dijudicat de proprio objecto . . .

[B] alio modo . . . quodam practico judicio, an sc., ita debeat esse, vel non ita (*ibid.,* I-II, q. 93, a. 2 ad 3; *De Ver.,* q. 8, a. 1 ad 13)

(A) *re proper object of faculty*

a) *per modum inclinationis:*—manente potentia, non deficit eius judicium circa proprium objectum: objectum autem proprium intellectus est quidditas rei (*ST,* I, q. 85, a. 6). Thus, also, all the instinctive judgments of sense. Cum judicium ad sapientem pertineat, secundum duplicem modum judicandi dupliciter sapientia accipitur. Contingit enim aliquem judicare

[a] uno modo per modum inclinationis, sicut qui habet habitum

. . .

[b] alio modo per modum cognitionis (*ibid.*, q. 6 ad 3).

b) *per modum cognitionis:*—judicium in nobis ut communiter fit per resolutionem in principia (*De Ver.*, q. 15, a. 1 ad 4). Dijudicare vero, vel mensurare, est actus intellectus applicantis principia certa ad examinationem propositorum; et ex hoc sumitur nomen mentis (*ST*, I, q. 79, a. 9 ad 4).

SAPIENTIAE: nam sapientiae est judicare (*ST*, q. 79, a. 10 ad 3).

(B) *PRUDENTIAE:* judicium est quasi conclusio, et determinatio consilii (*ibid.*, q. 83, a. 3 ad 2).
judicium, quod est sicut conclusio in syllogismo operabilium: *re practical decision;* for instance, in law court. Cf. Lexicon (*ibid.*, I-II, q. 13, a. 3).

THE MORALITY OF THE EXTERIOR ACT

PALMER ROCKEY

St. Thomas speaks of two general types of human acts which concern moral activity; namely, the interior and exterior act. The interior will-acts or elicited acts are those completed within the will. For example, one may wish to be truthful, or one may wish to kill some particular person. The exterior acts are those which involve man's other potencies and bodily actions. Examples of an exterior act are the giving of alms, the planning of a robbery, or the actual execution of the robbery. This article is primarily concerned with what St. Thomas says about the exterior act. Following his suggestion, we shall consider the exterior act from three basic standpoints: (1) the moral goodness of the exterior act; (2) the moral evil of the exterior act; (3) the indifferent exterior act.

> If we speak of the moral act according to its species, then not every moral act is good or evil, but some are morally indifferent, for the moral act receives its species from the object according to its relation to reason, as was said in the preceding article. Now, there is one sort of object which implies something in agreement with reason, and it makes [the moral act] good, in a general way (*ex genere*); for example, clothing the naked. There is another sort of object which implies something in discord with reason—such as taking what belongs to another—and this makes it bad, in a general way. And there is a third kind of object which neither implies something in agreement with reason, nor in discord with reason (for instance, lifting a straw from the ground, or some act like that), and this kind of act is said to be indifferent. On this point, those people are right who divide acts into three classes: good, evil, and indifferent.[1]

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[1]"Si ergo loquamur de actu morali secundum suam speciem, sic non omnis actus moralis est bonus vel malus, sed aliquis est indifferens; quia actus moralis speciem habet ex obiecto secundum ordinem ad rationem, ut supra (art. praeced.) dictum est. Est autem aliquod obiectum quod importat aliquid conveniens rationi, et facit esse bonum ex genere, sicut vestire nudum; aliquod autem obiectum quod importat aliquid discordans a ratione, sicut tollere alienum, et hoc facit malum in genere; quoddam vero obiectum ex quo

Starting with this basic text, we shall present the important distinctions St. Thomas makes with regard to this threefold division as it applies primarily to the exterior act.

St. Thomas states that a human act, which includes the exterior act, is one which proceeds from a deliberative will. If there is an act which proceeds without deliberation from the imagination, such as stroking the beard, this act is outside of the realm of moral activity and hence does not participate in moral good or evil.[2] Nor are we presently concerned with what is physically or nonvoluntarily good or evil; for example, the proper or improper functioning of a bodily organ. Now good and evil in human acts must be taken according to what is proper to man as man. This, however, is reason. Hence good and evil in human acts are to be considered according as the act is in conformity with reason informed by divine law, either naturally or through teaching or through infusion. Thus Dionysius says (*De divinis nominibus,* iv) that the evil of the soul is contrary to reason and that of the body contrary to nature.[3]

From another standpoint, however—namely, when one considers the human act as individual—then the threefold distinction mentioned above does not hold, for in this case moral acts are either good or bad. There cannot be a singular human act which is carried out without some particular circumstances which makes the act either right or wrong.

> But, if we speak of the moral act as individual, then every particular moral act must be good or evil because of some circumstance. For it cannot happen that the singular act go on without circumstances which make it right or wrong.[4]

Thus one can say that individual exterior acts are either good or bad in themselves. St. Thomas says that exterior actions may be good or evil in two ways. (1) They are good or evil according to their genus and the circumstances related to them. Hence if the required circumstances be observed, the giving of alms is a good moral act, for

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neque importat aliquid conveniens rationi, neque importat aliquid a ratione discordans, sicut levare festucam de terra, vel aliquid hujusmodi; et hujusmodi dicitur indifferens. Et quantum ad hoc bene dixerunt qui actus diviserunt trifarie, dicentes, quosdam esse bonos, quosdam malos, quosdam indifferentes" (*De Malo*, q. 2, a. 5).

[2]*In II Sent.*, d. 40, q. 1, a. 5.

[3]*De Malo*, q. 2, a. 4.

[4]"Si vero loquamur de actu morali secundum individuum, sic quilibet particularis actus moralis necesse est quod sit bonus vel malus propter aliquam circumstantiam. Non enim potest contingere quod actus singularis sine circumstantiis fiat, quae ipsum rectum faciant, vel indirectum" (*ibid.*, a. 5).

it is in keeping with right reason and therefore good in itself. (2) They are good or evil according to their relation to the end. For example, in the case of giving alms for vainglory, the act is said to be evil.[5] Here the exterior act is not in itself evil, but it is rendered morally evil because it proceeds from a corrupt intention or will.

> It must be said that there are certain sins in which the exterior acts are not evil in themselves, but [are evil] according as they proceed from a corrupt intention or will.[6]

Since the end is the proper object of the will, it is evident that the quality of good or evil which the exterior act has from its relation to the end is found first in the interior will-act and from it passes into the exterior act.

On the other hand, there are exterior acts which are evil in themselves.

> There are certain sins, however, in which the exterior acts are evil in themselves, such as theft, adultery, homicide, and the like.[7]

With regard to these acts, as well as other exterior acts good in themselves, there are further distinctions to be made. The goodness or malice which the exterior act has of itself because of its being about proper matter and attended by due circumstances, is not derived from the will but rather from reason. Hence if we consider the exterior act according as it is an ordination and apprehension of reason, then this external act is prior to the goodness of the will-act. But if we consider it from the standpoint of the execution of the act, the exterior act is subsequent to the goodness of the will which is its principle.[8]

We can obtain a better insight into this latter distinction by noting that the exterior act is the object of the will insofar as it is proposed to the will by reason as a good apprehended and ordained by it. In this way, then, the goodness of the exterior act is prior to that of the will. But insofar as the exterior act is considered from the standpoint of its execution, then it is an effect of the will and is subsequent to it. For example, when one reasons to the conclusion that it is good to save this drowning man, the apprehension of the act of saving the man as a good act is prior to the will-act. But as regards the actual

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[5]*Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 20, a. 1.

[6]"Dicendum quod quaedam peccata sunt in quibus actus exteriores non sunt secundum se mali, sed secundum quod ex corrupta intentione vel voluntate procedunt" (*De Malo*, q. 2, a. 3).

[7]"Quaedam autem peccata sunt in quibus exteriores actus sunt secundum se mali, sicut patet in furto, adulterio, homicido et similibus" (*ibid.*).

[8]*ST*, I-II, q. 20, a. 1.

saving of the man, the goodness is to be found prior in the will-act; for the exterior act as an effect of the will must be subsequent to it. Or put in another way, the exterior act is related to the will-act as an object which has the nature of an end. The end, however, is posterior in *esse,* but prior in intention.[9]

According to St. Thomas the exterior and interior acts are mutually related when the former carries through or completes the latter. One should note that the interior act is the basis for the moral quality of the whole moral act when completed in the exterior act. If the will is good from its proper object and end, it follows that the exterior action is good. If the will is good from the intention of the end, this is not enough to make the exterior act good. But if the will is evil either from the intention of the end or from the will-act, it follows that the exterior act is evil.

> If, therefore, the will be good both from its proper object and from its end, it follows that the external act is good. But if the will be good from its intention of the end, this is not enough to make the external act good; and if the will be evil either by reason of its intention of the end, or by reason of the act willed, it follows that the external act is evil.[10]

For the exterior act to be morally evil one single defect suffices, whereas for it to be morally good it must be good in every respect.

With regard to this mutual relationship between the interior and exterior act, there arises the question of whether the exterior act adds any goodness or evil to the interior will-act. Each of these two acts, considered in itself, has some goodness which it gives to the other. The exterior act has a goodness which arises from the commensuration of circumstances, according as it is proportionate to the end sought by man. And since the exterior act is related to the will as an object, the interior will-act gets this goodness from the exterior act, not indeed considered as exercised but as intended and wished. But a certain formal goodness is present in the interior will-act in itself in that the will is the master of its acts and thus the act has the formal nature of merit or praiseworthiness. And this goodness proceeds from the interior act to the exterior.

I answer that the exterior act and the interior act of the will

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[9]*De Malo,* q. 2, a. 3, c.

[10]"Si igitur voluntas sit bona et ex obiecto proprio, et ex fine, consequens est actum exteriorem esse bonum. Sed non sufficit ad hoc quod actus exterior sit bonus bonitate voluntatis, quae est ex intentione finis. Sed si voluntas sit mala sive ex intentione finis, sive ex actu volito, consequens est actum exteriorem esse malum" (*ST,* I-II, q. 20, a. 2).

> are mutually related in this way: each is at times the cause of goodness in the other; and each, considered in itself, has some goodness which it gives to the other. For the exterior act has a goodness arising from the commensuration of circumstances, according as it is proportionate to the end to be sought by man. And since the exterior act is related to the will as an object, the interior will-act gets this goodness from the exterior act; not indeed from it considered as exercised but as intended and wished; for, insofar as it is exercised, it follows the will-act. But some formal goodness is present in the interior will-act in itself, inasmuch as the will is the master of its own acts, and, on this basis, the act has the formal nature (*rationem*) of merit or is praiseworthy; and this goodness proceeds from the interior act to the exterior one.[11]

In the light of this text we may say that there is a twofold goodness in the whole moral act in which the interior will-act and the exterior act are both good.

With regard to this point, St. Thomas makes further enlightening distinctions concerning the influence of the exterior act on the moral goodness or evil of the interior act. If we speak of the goodness which the exterior act derives from the end, then the exterior act adds nothing to the goodness or evil of the whole moral act, unless it happens that the will in itself is made better in good things or worse in evil things. This, seemingly, may happen in three ways. First, with regard to number, if a man wishes to do something with a good or an evil end in view and does not do it at that moment, but later on wills and does it, the act of his will is doubled and a double good or evil follows. Secondly, as regards extension, a man may wish to do something for a good or an evil end and is hindered by some obstacle, whereas another man perseveres in the movement of the will until he accomplishes the work. It is evident that the will-act of the latter is more lasting in good or evil and therefore is better or worse. Thirdly, with regard to intensity, there are certain exterior acts which, insofar as they are

[11]"Respondeo dicendum, quod actus exterior et actus interior voluntatis hoc modo comparantur ad invicem, quod uterque quodammodo est alteri bonitatis causa; et uterque, quantum in se est, quamdam bonitatem habet quam alteri dat. Actus enim exterior bonitatem habet ex circumstantiarum commensuratione, secundum quam proportionatus est ad finem hominis consequendum. Et quia actus exterior comparatur ad voluntatem sicut obiectum, inde est quod hanc bonitatem voluntatis actus interior ab exteriori habet, non quidem ex eo secundum quod est exercitus, sed secundum quod est intentus et volitus; quia secundum quod est exercitus, sequitur actum voluntatis. Sed quaedam ratio bonitatis consistit in actu interioris voluntatis secundum se, secundum quod voluntas est domina suorum actuum, secundum quam bonitatem actus habet rationem meriti vel laudabilis; et haec bonitas ex actu interiori in exteriorem procedit" (*In II Sent.*, d. 40, q. 1, a. 3).

pleasurable or painful are such as naturally to make the will-act more or less intense. It follows the more intensely the will tends to good or evil, the better or worse it is.[12]

We may consider a particular example which will illustrate the fine distinctions made by St. Thomas in the above-mentioned text. First, from the standpoint of number. Let us consider the case wherein a man wishes to take revenge on another by inflicting bodily blows. Though he may want to do this morally evil act while coming home from work, he refrains from doing so. But later that evening he wishes to do this evil act and then proceeds to do it. At this point the evil of the act of the will is doubled, numerically speaking. Secondly, extensively considered. While coming home from work the would-be offender may refrain from taking revenge because an obstacle is present; namely, a policeman is walking down the other side of the street. On the other hand, he may patiently wait and continue the movement and wish of his will-act until he is sure the policeman is out of sight, and then commit his act of revenge. In this latter instance, the will-act lasts longer, and hence the moral evil is increased. Thirdly, from the viewpoint of intensity. While inflicting blows upon his victim, the offender experiences and increases the pleasure he gets out of striking the victim. In this instance the intensity of the will-act is increased and thereby the evil of the whole moral act.

The exterior act can be considered from another standpoint which involves the important question of whether the consequences of the exterior act increase its goodness or malice. The consequences of the action are either foreseen or not. If a man foresees that many evils will follow from his action and yet proceeds to do the act, his will is thereby shown to be more inordinate. Hence, in this case, the consequences of the act increase its malice.

> The consequences of an act are either foreseen or not. If they are foreseen, it is evident that they increase the goodness or malice. For when a man foresees that many evils may follow from his act and yet does not therefore desist from it, this shows his will to be all the more inordinate.[13]

Hence if a man foresees that in robbing a certain neighborhood grocery store he will bring added sufferings to the groceryman and his large

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[12] *ST*, I-II, q. 20, a. 4.

[13] "Respondeo dicendum, quod eventus sequens aut est praecogitatus aut non. Si est praecogitatus, manifestum est quod addit ad bonitatem vel malitiam actus; cum enim aliquis cogitat quod ex opere suo multa mala possunt sequi, nec propter hoc dimittit, ex hoc apparet voluntas ejus esse magis inordinata" (*ibid.*, a. 5).

family, the evil of the act of theft is thereby increased by the harmful consequences.

Concerning consequences which are not foreseen, St. Thomas makes other distinctions. If the consequences follow from the nature of the act in the majority of cases, then the consequences increase the goodness or malice of the action. For it is evident that an act is better in its genus when many good things follow it and worse when many bad results flow from it. For example, if one publicly commits fornication, in the majority of cases many people will be scandalized. Now, even if the fornicator did not foresee or intend these scandals, nevertheless the evil of his act of fornication is increased because of the harmful consequences.[14] On the other hand, if the consequences of the act follow by accident and are infrequent, then they do not add to the goodness or malice of the action. In this case the action is not judged to be evil or good according to what belongs to it by accident but according to what belongs to it of itself. For example, if a lumberjack, while felling a tree, should accidentally kill a man, there is no added moral evil in question.[15] In this particular case, the agent did not foresee the unfortunate accident which was about to happen and which, in fact, rarely happens. But if always or in most cases evil is joined with a good which is intended in itself, one still commits sin and adds to the evil of the act, even if one does not intend the evil. Thus to the pleasure experienced in an act of adultery, there is always present an evil; namely, a violation of the virtue of justice.[16]

Finally, it remains for us to consider what the nature of the indifferent exterior act is and how it can become morally good or evil. As we have seen in our first basic text, there are certain acts which, according to their species, have objects that do not involve anything either in accordance with, or contrary to, right reason. Thus to lift a straw from the ground or to walk across a field or to throw a ball are indifferent in themselves when considered as acts according to their species. Such acts have a certain natural goodness inasmuch as they are acts and have being, but they are indifferent to moral good or malice.

> If we consider the act inasmuch as it is act, then it has a certain natural goodness inasmuch as it has being; but it is indifferent to moral good and evil.[17]

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[14]*Ibid.*, q. 73, a. 8.
[15]*De Malo*, q. 1, a. 3 ad 15m.
[16]*Ibid.*
[17]"Si enim significetur actus in eo quod est agere, habet quidem bonitatem

But if we consider these acts as individual they become particular moral acts which are necessarily good or evil. The reason for this is that every singular human act, since it proceeds from, and is commanded by, reason and will, has some circumstance that makes it either morally good or evil.[18] Thus while walking across a field, one may be moving towards a specific place where one wishes to commit murder. Here the exterior act receives its evil character from the will-act. This intention brings the act of walking across the field into the moral sphere, so that it becomes morally evil. Even here, though the act of murder be morally evil in itself in that it is contrary to right reason, it still has a certain formal character of goodness because it is a human act and has being.[19] On the other hand, the indifferent act of walking across the field may become a morally good act from the fact that one wishes to honor God by helping a fellow farmer with his plowing. In this case, one may say that the exterior act has a double goodness; namely, the fact that it is a human act and has being plus the added moral goodness of the act.

From the preceding considerations of this article we may point out St. Thomas's basic standpoints with regard to the morality of the exterior act. There are two general types of human acts which concern moral actions; namely, the interior and exterior act. We may consider the exterior act when it is morally good, morally evil, and morally indifferent. We noted that the exterior act proceeds from a deliberative will. Acts which do not have this characteristic do not concern moral good or evil. Now, good and evil in human acts is ascertained by considering whether the act is in accord with right reason.

If one considers a singular human act, one finds that there is always some particular circumstance which makes the act either right or wrong. Individual exterior acts may be good or evil according to their genus and the circumstances related to them and according to their relation to an end. Thus the giving of alms is morally good in itself, but if given for vainglory, the act is morally evil. Moreover, there are exterior acts which are evil in themselves. When considered as ordered and apprehended by reason, the exterior act is prior to the goodness of the will-act. From the standpoint of the execution of the act, the exterior act is subsequent to the goodness of the will.

Concerning their mutual relationship, the interior act is the basis for the moral quality of the whole moral act when completed in the

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naturalem inquantum est ens; sed indifferenter se habet ad bonitatem et malitiam moralem" (*In II Sent.*, d. 40, a. 5).

[18]*De Malo*, q. 2, a. 5.

[19]*Ibid.*, a. 2, 4.

exterior act. One single defect can render the exterior act morally evil; the exterior act must be good in every respect if it is to be morally good. Furthermore, each of these two acts has some goodness which it imparts to the other. The exterior act is good because of the proper circumstances and end desired by the moral agent. The interior act receives its goodness from the exterior act considered as intended and willed. Finally, the exterior act can add to the goodness or the evil of the whole moral act with regard to number, when the will of the agent is doubled in the sense that double good or evil follows; with regard to extension, when perseverance in the movement of the will makes the will-act more lasting in good or evil; with regard to intensity, when the pleasure or pain resulting from the exterior act makes the will more or less intense.

The moral agent either foresees the consequence of the exterior act or he does not. If the consequences are foreseen, the malice of the act is increased. If the consequences are not foreseen and yet follow from the nature of the act in the majority of cases, the consequences increase the goodness or evil of the act. If the consequences of the act follow accidentally or infrequently, then they do not add to the goodness or evil of the act.

Finally, there are exterior acts which, according to their species are morally indifferent; for example, kicking a pebble or picking up a dish. But these very acts, when considered as individual human acts, necessarily are morally good or evil because of some pertinent circumstance. Hence the indifferent exterior act can receive its evil character from a bad will-act. On the other hand, the indifferent act may become morally good because of the moral agent's good intention. In the latter case, the exterior act is doubly good because it has moral goodness coupled with the goodness of a human act which has being.

NOTES AND DISCUSSION

SIXTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE MISSOURI STATE PHILOSOPHY ASSOCIATION

John E. Gurr, S.J.

Saint Louis University was host to the sixth annual meeting of the Missouri State Philosophy Association held Friday and Saturday, October 30 and 31, 1953. Friday afternoon was devoted to three independent papers followed by discussion. A symposium, "Philosophy and Human Experience," concluded the two-day program Saturday morning. The presidential address, annual dinner, and business meeting were on the agenda Friday evening.

Albert William Levi, Washington University, read the first afternoon paper, "On being One's Self." He was followed by R. L. Witherspoon, a Saint Louis attorney, whose paper was "The Historical, Constitutional, and Legal Bases for the Doctrine of Separation of Government and Religion in the United States of America." Thomas P. McTighe, Maryville College, closed the afternoon session with "Galileo as a Philosopher."

W. Donald Oliver, University of Missouri, gave "Man's Knowledge of Man" as his presidential address at the annual dinner.

Elizabeth Ramsden Eames, House Springs, Missouri, opened the Saturday morning symposium with a paper entitled "Experience and Theory of Knowledge." The Reverend George P. Klubertanz, Saint Louis University, then presented "Metaphysics and Experience," which was followed by the third paper, "Human Conduct and Philosophical Ethics," by Donald Clark Hodges, University of Missouri. The papers were well received and, together with the previous day's offerings, stimulated an interchange of questions and opinion between the audience and the symposium leaders. Discussion centered around the method and meaning of critical reflection on experience and stimulated analysis of the components involved.

Harold A. Durfee, Park College (Parkville), was elected president and Miss Caroline Nations was re-elected secretary-treasurer of the association. At the invitation of the University of Missouri, the 1954 meeting will be held at Columbia. Sidney Zink will be program chairman.

ADDENDA TO "A SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM"

J. Clayton Murray, S.J.

Commager, Henry Steele. "Guilt by Association," *New York Times Magazine*, Nov. 8, 1953.

Davis, Elmer. "The Scholar in a Time of Peril," *The American Scholar*, XX (1950).

Duryea, E. D. Jr. "Academic Freedom: A Long View," *Journal of Higher Education*, XXIV (Oct. 1953).

"Freedom to Read." Joint statement of the American Library Association and the American Book Publishers Council, *Library Journal*, LXXVIII (Aug., 1953).

Gellhorn, Walter. *Security, Loyalty and Science.* Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1950.
See the review of this book by Laurence Sears in *American Scholar*, XX (1951).

"It Also Happened at Harvard. Basic documents concerning the cases of three faculty members who refused to answer questions asked by Congressional Investigating Committees," *Educational Record*, XXXIV (Oct., 1953).

"It Did Happen at Rutgers. Basic documents concerning the case of two professors who refused to answer questions asked by the Internal Security Subcommittee of the United States Senate," *Educational Record*, XXXIV (April, 1953).

Jones, Howard Mumford. "Do You Know the Nature of an Oath?," *The American Scholar*, XX (1951).

MacLeish, Archibald. "The American State of Mind," *The American Scholar*, XIX (1950).
See the comments on this article in "The Reader Replies," *ibid.*, XX (1951).

Sears, Laurence. "Security and Liberty," *The American Scholar*, XX (1951).

Spaulding, William E. "Can Textbooks be Subversive?," *Educational Record*, XXXIV (1953).

Stewart, George R. *The Year of the Oath.* Garden City: Doubleday, 1950.
See the review of this book by Laurence Sears in *The American Scholar*, XX (1951).

Van Doren, Mark. "If Anybody Wants to Know," *The American Scholar*, XX (1951).

BOOK REVIEWS

Neuf leçons sur les notions premières de la philosophie morale, **By Jacques Maritain. Paris: Téqui, 1951. Pp. 195.**

Ethics and Facts. The Puzzling Pattern of Human Existence. **By J. Messner. St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1952. Pp. v. + 327. $4.00.**

Two more widely different books in the field of Thomistic morality could hardly be selected. In spirit, content and methods these works are far apart. Where Maritain is the metaphysician extending his insights and reasoning into the practical order, Messner is the social scientist gathering a vast amount of data into a systematic interpretation. Where Maritain concentrates on the principles of ethical thinking, Messner moves in moral judgment among the contingent facts of everyday life. Maritain writes a prolegomenon to general ethics; Messner an epilogue to special ethics. There are few authors mentioned in Maritain's lectures: his book is quite evidently the product of personal meditation and reflection. Messner cites hundreds of writers and endeavors to convince the reader that there is much in this contemporary literature to confirm traditional moral views.

As in his earlier *Preface to Metaphysics,* in this work on moral philosophy Maritain uses a small number of essential notions to explain his views. The good as moral value becomes the formal object of practical reason. This value theory (Lectures 2, 3, and 4) is developed in a suggestive and useful way. Discussion of the ultimate end of man is held off until Lecture 4 has completed the consideration of value. Then liberty, obligation, and the norm of morality are explained, with this realistic axiology as a background. Right, duty, moral fault, and sanction are discussed in the final lectures. Law and conscience are not primary topics. One gets the impression that, while these nine lectures were the material of a summer course (1949), the book is actually directed to readers who know some ethics and are interested in the more profound insights which Maritain certainly has. It is a good book for teachers of ethics to read.

Dr. Messner's book is very neatly organized. He divides the problems of human life into those arising from five instincts; the impulse of sex, the instincts toward happiness, liberty, social life, and knowledge. His technique is well illustrated in his handling of the first impulse. Many pages are devoted to the views of Freud and later psychologists. Margaret Mead tells about dating practices in the schools of the United States and similar activities in Samoa. St. Augustine, Oscar Wilde, Nietzsche, and Ortega y Gasset give varied testimony on the nature of love. Dozens of others are gleaned for their comments

on sex problems.

As Messner goes through this impressive collection of literature on each problem, he is quite open and broad-minded—evidently working on the hypothesis that there is something good in all points of view. At the end of each of his five impulses, however, he manages to conclude that traditional morality was and is the best. It is in this sense that he is a Thomist; for the final vote he always moves to the side of the angels, or at least of the Angelic Doctor.

Often it is suggested that Thomistic ethicians should be more up-to-date (particularly the present writer), that they should get to know these new things uncovered by the psychologists and social scientists. To these good critics let me recommend Dr. Messner's book; it is a Who's Who and What's What in social science. After they have read *Ethics and Facts*, let them ask themselves whether Freud, or Margaret Mead, or Simone de Beauvoir, or all the others have had any real effect on Messner's conclusions. I am inclined to think not. On the value of most "science" in the social area, I am inclined to quote Maritain's curt comment on logical positivism: "Je la tiens pour absurde."

VERNON J. BOURKE

Saint Louis University

The Platonic Heritage of Thomism. **By Arthur Little, S.J. Dublin; Golden Eagle Books, Ltd. Pp. xv + 286.**

Since the works of Geiger, Fabro, De Finance, and Santeler there has been considerable interest in the problem of Platonic and Neoplatonic elements in the thought of St. Thomas. Many scholars have claimed that even some of the most central theses in Thomism are of Platonic rather than Aristotelian origin. Father Little belonged to this group, although his claims of Platonism in St. Thomas are perhaps less moderate than others have been willing to make. Others before him had affirmed the Platonic character of the Thomistic doctrines of participation and exemplarity. Father Little, as we shall see, in *The Platonic Heritage of Thomism* goes much further still and makes the remarkable suggestion that even the famous real distinction of essence and *esse* is Platonic in origin.

Before we consider the latter claim, some of the general principles of interpretation operative in Little's book should be described. Little supposes, first of all, that it can be shown that St. Thomas's interpretation of Aristotle was either inadvertently or perhaps deliberately mistaken. (There is, on page 26, what seems to be an unequivocal attribution to St. Thomas of a deliberate policy of refusing to give Plato his due, even when, according to Little, St. Thomas was clearly convinced that Plato had discovered the truth in some matter.) St. Thomas is thus depicted in Chapter 2 as having given to Aristotle's doctrine "a more orthodox sense than that doctrine deserved." The conclusion is then drawn (and used as a kind of canon of method) that "if he did, it will be open to us to assign to Platonic influences many Thomistic ideas that St. Thomas himself believed to be inherited from Aristotle" (p. 20).

Leaving aside for the moment the question of who is right in Father Little's quarrel with St. Thomas over the interpretation of Aristotle, we may well ask what is the force of Little's conclusion. The inference seems to clearly involve a *non sequitur*. We may well grant that many crucial and characteristic Thomistic doctrines are not to be found, at least explicitly, in Aristotle. But from this it by no means necessarily follows that they must therefore have had their origin in Plato. This would, of course, imply that St. Thomas was little more than an eclectic, limited furthermore to only two sources from which to borrow and quite devoid of any original philosophical insights of his own.

The great defect of Aristotle, Little tells us, comes from his unqualified rejection of Platonic Ideas and participation. In doing so, according to Little, Aristotle "had committed himself logically to a denial of any influx of efficient causality of heaven upon earth and consequently to the postulate of an eternal world eternally in motion" (p. 22). We seem to have here another *non sequitur*. That Aristotle held the last of these two doctrines is admitted by everyone, including St. Thomas, although one might question Father Little's denial of any equivocal or analogical causality in Aristotle. But it is by no means immediately evident that these are consequences following upon the rejection of Platonic Forms and Platonic participation, and that St. Thomas could only avoid them by embracing what Aristotle had rejected. It is, furthermore, impossible for this reviewer to see how these two doctrines—which receive their essential meaning in Plato only in the context of the *chorismos* or separation of the Forms not only from sensibles, but even from their own essence, the One—could entail any theory of efficient causality, exemplarity, or intrinsic formal causality which St. Thomas could have accepted.

It has far too often been supposed that such a term as "participation" has the same meaning and function in the Thomistic doctrinal context as it has in Platonic thought. Nothing could be further from the truth. Platonic participation presupposes the Platonic *chorismos*, which makes it quite impossible for the subject which participates to possess in any *intrinsic* way the perfection which it participates. It therefore necessarily follows that Platonic participation is radically incompatible with any properly analogical doctrine of being. As an ineluctable consequence (though one which seems often to have escaped the attention of even such a competent scholar as Geiger) the term "participation" is wholly equivocal in Plato and St. Thomas, and has no community of meaning which can be transferred from one doctrinal context to the other. It follows also that exemplarity will have an utterly different meaning and function in the two philosophies. Whatever Aristotle's defects in this regard may be, Plato is the least likely source in the history of philosophy for these Thomistic positions.

The most startling of Father Little's claims is the ascription to Plato of the doctrine of the real distinction of essence and *esse*. Father Little writes on p. 184:

> The composition of potency and act discovered by him was not that of matter and form (Aristotle's achievement) but of essence and existence. His composition of being and non-being

> is a composition of existence with non-existence, that yet existed as the limit of the existence. The evidence moreover that he regarded them as really distinct seems to me convincing. That he regarded them as *physically* distinct was an error of secondary importance. What is most startling is that for a gleaming moment he saw unspoiled the metaphysical law of the real distinction of contingent existence from its limiting principle of no-more existence, or the essence. . .

What Little had in mind was presumably the Platonic distinction of the One and the Indeterminate Dyad, or Limit and Unlimited, whose mysterious mingling brings about the "generation into essence" described in the *Philebus*. No account is taken of the fact that in such a theory the supreme act is not *esse*, but rather the One which is beyond being. Being itself for Plato is derivative and secondary, an imperfect and composite image of unity. It is its *unity* which makes a being to be, not *esse*. But its very unity is not its own, but rather participated and hence separated from it. That which "limits" the One, as the receptacle in which are reflected the manifold and diverse images of unity called beings, is a principle which in itself is *other* than either unity or being. Plato calls it nonbeing, and its existence is asserted in the *Sophist* as the only possible explanation of difference and multiplicity. Unlike the Thomistic doctrine of the analogy of being (but true to the Eleatic and Platonic univocity of being), the differences between beings are not themselves being. Only nonbeing can differentiate (in a wholly extrinsic way) being conceived generically, and it is precisely this nonbeing Plato asserted exists. It is this principle which Little embraced, and in it he thought he recognized St. Thomas's passive potency which limits act.

What are we to think of such an interpretation? A privation or negation does not have any potency whatsoever for positive perfection, much less for the perfection of actual existence. Little's attempted identification of passive potency in St. Thomas with Plato's existing nonbeing necessarily destroys the proper proportionality of being, the analogy which is at the very heart of the meaning of participation in St. Thomas. There can be no sense in which a privation or negation has a positive perfection of any kind proportioned to it.

Little's position illustrates the grave danger of misinterpreting the famous Thomistic dictum that potency limits act. That principle is indeed valid and fundamental in St. Thomas's thought. But it functions always in the living context of the analogy of being, of the proportioning of *esse* to essence, something which is meaningless if essence is identified with formal nonbeing.

On many pages of this book one finds statements which seem historically inaccurate or sweeping generalizations which appear rash and unsupported by any solid, scholarly appeal to the primary texts of either Plato, Aristotle, or St. Thomas. Undoubtedly much of this is due to the fact that Father Little's untimely death prevented this stimulating philosopher from having sufficient time to moderate the more exaggerated positions of the book and to support what would have

been his ultimate opinions with a more impressive scholarly documentation. Even in its present state the book is not dull and shows evidence of a daring and original mind. But it cannot be regarded as a reliable guide to the thought of St. Thomas.

LEONARD J. ESLICK

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Philosophers Speak of God. **By Charles Hartshorne and William L. Reese. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1953. Pp. xiv + 535. $7.50.**

As the preface points out, this book can be considered in two ways: as a collection of source materials in natural theology and as a systematic argument in favor of the special doctrine of panentheism. It is evident, however, that the first aspect depends upon the second. The readings are selected mainly with a view toward showing that speculations about God are adequate only in the degree that they approach Professor Hartshorne's panentheistic position. Hence this is no ordinary book of readings but a historical and analytic apologia on a grand scale, with the selected texts serving as negative or positive *pièces de justification.*

By "God" is meant, nominally, the supremely excellent, good, and worshipful being. Panentheism is defined as that doctrine which alone succeeds in attributing all of the five following attributes to God: He is eternal in His absolute or abstract essence; temporal in His relative or concrete actuality; conscious; knowing the world; including the world in His surrelative actuality but not in His absolute essence. With this standard in mind, Hartshorne and Reese divide the work into three parts: classical views on God, modern (nineteenth- and twentieth-century) views, and some varieties of ancient and modern skeptical-atheistic standpoints. The third part has only a peripheral role. It samples the theories of men like Hume, Schopenhauer, Feuerbach, and Nietzsche. The core of the work is found in the first and second parts, dealing with the classical and modern positions. The various theories are sorted out under these major headings: Aristotle's theism, classical theism, classical pantheism, Plotinus's emanationism, temporalistic theism, and panentheism.

The principle of classification is the systematic one of determining how many of the above-mentioned attributes are present in a given philosophy of God. Thus Plotinus and H. N. Wieman are minimal extremes, the former regarding God as the bare eternity of the One and the latter regarding Him as pure temporal flow. A little higher up on the scale are Aristotle (God as eternal and conscious) and Samuel Alexander (God as temporal, conscious, and knowing the world). About midway in the hierarchy of increasingly comprehensive doctrines comes what the authors-editors call "classical theism" (God as eternal, conscious, and knowing the world). The representatives of this trend included here are: Philo, Augustine, Anselm, Al-Ghazzali, Maimonides, Aquinas, Descartes, Leibniz, Kant, W. E. Channing, and Baron von Hügel. Mounting still higher, we find the pantheism of Spinoza and

Royce (God as eternal, conscious, knowing the world, and including it) and the temporalistic theism of Socinus and Jules Lequier (God as eternal, temporal, conscious, and knowing the world). Hartshorne and Reese discern some classical anticipations of their panentheistic summit in Hindu and Judæo-Christian scriptures, as well as in Plato. But their main historical support is drawn from Schelling, Fechner, Whitehead, Berdyaev, William James, and E. S. Brightman.

A common procedure is followed in dealing with the individual thinkers. First, a sympathetic sketch is made of the man's general outlook and approach to God. Then follow the selected passages, which vary in length from a page or two to quite extensive readings from such sources as Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, Aquinas, Schelling, and Whitehead. Finally, the authors-editors provide a systematic criticism, from the vantage point of panentheism. Oftentimes the critical commentary equals or exceeds in length the excerpted passages. By means of this apportioning of space, the doctrinal argument is continued at full intensity throughout the book. Panentheism emerges as the heir of all the ages of human inquiry about God and the victor over all philosophies that refuse to admit the presence of all five distinguishing traits in God.

Although it is fruitless to cavil about inclusion or exclusion of materials simply on historical grounds, there are two doctrinal omissions which seriously impair the value of the readings and the validity of the apologia. The first concerns the basic law of polarity, while the second concerns the question of proofs of God's existence.

The authors-editors claim that the conflict between theism and pantheism can be overcome by using the so-called law of polarity. The full perfection of reality must include both act and potency, both eternity and time, both permanence and change, both action and passion. Hence a comprehensive doctrine on God, the supremely perfect being, must affirm in Him both of these poles. Panentheism is bipolar, whereas the classical forms of theism and pantheism are onesided or monopolar. Now, there is a definite history behind this precise use of polarity as a strictly demonstrative principle and a gateway to the understanding of God. In the modern world it has found its chief exponents in Cusanus and Bruno, Fichte and Hegel. Yet none of these men are represented in the present collection of sources. This means that the student is not given the opportunity to examine and evaluate the logical foundation upon which the entire work rests. The authors-editors have not offered a rigorous justification of this presumed law of being. Even more seriously, they have not faced the counterclaim of some forms of classical theism to be not merely *mono*polar but *non*polar in their study of being. Thomism, for instance, does not conduct its metaphysical investigations under the sign of the metaphor of poles of being. Rather, it makes a conscious effort to criticize all such metaphorical, imaginative representations of the principles of being. The omission of a thorough discussion of this issue means that the major premise of panentheism has yet to be grounded in evidence. And for those theists who are inclined to appeal to polarity as a reconciling principle in philosophical disputes, the present employment of this principle should

provide an occasion for reconsideration of whether polarity is indeed a metaphysical principle or an imaginative scaffold, for use after demonstration has been made.

The second major omission concerns the arguments for God's existence. The authors-editors have not adopted an entirely consistent policy about this issue. They give a sixfold enumeration of the types of arguments and add that all valid arguments must be a priori and based upon essential necessities rather than the contingencies of actuality. Furthermore, they present and criticize Aristotle's argument for the first unmoved mover, and they also present and defend the ontological argument in its several historical forms. These commitments on the part of the authors-editors exert a determining influence upon their conception of how the human mind studies the divine nature and what the human mind can validly affirm about this nature. Yet they also maintain that the problem of rehabilitating the various arguments lies beyond the intention of the present book. What is here omitted is the vigorous theistic tradition in favor of a purely a posteriori approach to God's existence based upon the implications of contingent actuality and finite acts of existing. This latter tradition maintains, moreover, that the manner in which one establishes the truth of the proposition "God exists" exercises a regulative influence over what one can and cannot affirm about God's nature and the relation of the world to God. Hence the reader is not given the materials to judge whether or not the problem of how we know God's existence is relevant for the Hartshorne-Reese project of classifying and criticizing the various historical doctrines on God's nature and the world.

As I observed in a review of Hartshorne's *The Divine Relativity* (THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN, XXVII [March, 1950], 222-26), the issue between panentheism and at least Thomistic theism cannot be settled solely on the basis of arguments about the divine nature. Yet the selections from Aquinas included here are confined to his treatment of the divine knowledge, the divine will, and the relation between the world and God. No account is taken of how the position of Aquinas on these issues is controlled by his view of how we demonstrate the truth of the proposition that "God exists," as well as the divine simplicity and presence to all things. By cutting off the problems of knowledge, will, and relation from their metaphysical roots, the authors-editors can phrase their criticism in the form of leading questions. If eternity belongs to God, then why not temporality as well? How else can we understand God to be loving, except as supposing Him to have real relations and passion, change and suffering, in respect to creatures? But these questions are neither forceful nor relevant, unless they are grounded in two prior discussions: the validity of the law of polarity as a strict principle of metaphysical demonstration, and the connection between the human way of demonstrating the truth of God's existence and the human way of demonstrating truths about God's nature and the God-world relationship. Since these prior problems are left out of the book, it retains a topheavy and arbitrary appearance.

Unfortunately, it is necessary to add that the authors-editors' sympathy and urbanity are displayed everywhere except in the direction

of present-day proponents of "classical theism," especially Thomists. The obdurate refusal of the latter to admit a temporal aspect in God, along with accidental, mutable, and other potential features, calls down fire from the editorial heavens. The Thomists are branded as "the half-truth addicts" and employers of "the 'method of tenacity' in defense of ancient ideas." Their repudiation of temporalism and panentheism is due to "metaphysical incompetence" and leads to "the naked worship of power," balefully supported by "a hierarchical view of ecclesiastical polity." I cannot see where this sort of invective advances any philosophical discussion. It certainly does nothing to remove the twofold defect in the case for panentheism.

This book contains a serious piece of philosophical reasoning and documentation. Hence it is eminently worthy of careful study by philosophers and theologians. But it is difficult to see how the book could be used in the classroom either as a text or a reference work, unless the instructor himself were a convinced panentheist.

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Das Heilige und das Gute. **By Bernhard Häring. Freiburg im Breisgau: Erich Wewel Verlag, 1950. Pp. 318. DM 9.80.**

The Redemptorist Father Häring employs the resources of the phenomenological method to clarify the nature of the connection between the holy and the good. In post-Kantian Germany this problem has assumed increasing importance, since it involves the relation between religion and morality. Kant himself had based religion on morality and had subordinated the holy to an impersonal moral law. This did not satisfy a religious-romantic soul like Friedrich Schleiermacher, who wanted to preserve the distinctive character of the religious attitude. Under his influence, religion became associated with the special organ of feeling. Although this secured the mutual independence of the holy (as the object of feeling) and the good (as the object of will), the question then arose whether an integration can ever be made between the holy and the good. A firm negative answer was given to this question by Nicolai Hartmann, who suggested that there is an intrinsic enmity between the ethical and religious outlooks. By radicalizing the Kantian conception of autonomous morality and self-legislation, Hartmann concluded that the moral ideal is incompatible with any religious reference of human actions to a divine norm. It is against this historical background that the present study of the holy and the good is undertaken.

Häring distinguishes sharply between the philosophy of religion and the phenomenology of religion. The former is concerned with the question of truth and with a testing of various religious values. But as the author conceives it, the phenomenological approach to religion prescinds entirely from an ultimate determination of truth and value. It concentrates upon a description of the various essential acts constituting the religious attitude of men. Häring's own inquiry is purely phenomenological and hence is subject to the essential limitations of

this method. For instance, it cannot decide the issue between monotheism, polytheism, and pantheism, but can only offer faithful analyses of the religious acts found within each of these doctrinal settings. No mention is made of Husserl's very different conception of phenomenology, which developed into something more than a purely methodological and descriptive discipline; nor is any use made of the investigations of Edith Stein into the nature of religious and ethical values.

Instead, the author takes his guidance chiefly from Rudolf Otto, Max Scheler, and Dietrich von Hildebrand. He stresses the intentional character of religious acts, which are just as much directed toward a real object as are the acts of scientific knowing and moral willing. Prayer has to do with man's situation of standing before a personal God. The religious situation is based upon the awareness of an encounter between the finite and the infinite person, in which the initiative is taken by the latter. Häring makes a distinction between "the sacral ethos" and "sanctioned ethics." By the former term is meant the general religious recognition that the created individual is placed under a demand to respond to God and to shape his life in a corresponding way. Phenomenological analysis shows that the more one regards God as a personal and absolute being the more one also tends to impenetrate his practical life with a religious spirit. Thus religion always encloses some degree of a sacral ethos, some relation of our practical powers to God, taken as the supreme good as well as the supreme holy one. But a religious attitude does not necessarily entail a detailed, sanctioned ethics; conversely, ethical attitudes do not always flower into a religious bond with God.

Four components of the ethical good are subjected to a detailed analysis: value, obligation, freedom, and conscience. In every instance the author holds that the basic ethical acts can be present, even where the absolute good is regarded in an impersonal, nonreligious way. Yet phenomenological comparison also reveals that the plenary meaning of these four ethical components points in the direction of a personal absolute as the highest good. Following Scheler quite closely in his two final chapters, Häring argues for the intrinsic harmony between an ethic of self-realization and a religious service of God. In the Christian moral ideal of the following of Christ, the misleading opposition between autonomy and heteronomy is overcome. Yet the basic distinction between the holy and the good is not thereby wiped out. One discovers the peak of holiness in the religious relation of love of God, whereas one finds the supreme goodness in the moral relation of faithful obedience to God's commands. The reconciliation and even convergence between the holy and the good increase with the individual's growing awareness of the personal life of God and the personal nature of our relation with Him.

Nevertheless, a nagging question assails the reader who follows these penetrating historical and descriptive analyses. How is the author going to relate his findings to the plane of philosophical truth and valuation? Häring states that phenomenology is only an instrument in the service of philosophy and is not itself a philosophical tendency. But he does not provide any hint as to how the instrumental integration of

phenomenology with philosophy is to be achieved. Apparently, he accepts the validity of a philosophy of religion, but refrains from making the transition to this terrain. The difficulty is that the thinker upon whom he chiefly relies—Max Scheler—did establish the closest relationship between the phenomenology and philosophy of religion, and arrived at a cosmic pantheism. Although Häring notes that he is choosing only "the best features" in Scheler's thought, he does not establish on purely phenomenological grounds his principle of selectivity. He agrees descriptively with Scheler on the crucial point that God as the intentional object of religion is not the same as the God of metaphysics and ethics. But he refrains from drawing the Schelerian conclusion that therefore a phenomenologically orientated philosophy of religion must liberate itself from the metaphysics of pure act. Häring's refusal to take this further step is surely indicative of a definite view about the relation between metaphysics and phenomenology. But as it stands, the present work does not enable us to determine whether the phenomenological approach to religious acts can develop into a philosophy of religion, which would not be a substitute for the metaphysical doctrine on God.

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Les métamorphoses de la Cité de Dieu. **By Etienne Gilson. Paris, Vrin; Louvain: Publications Universitaires de Louvain, 1952. Pp. ix + 291.**

This work represents the published version of a series of lectures inaugurating the new Chair of Cardinal Mercier at the University of Louvain. In it Professor Gilson takes us on one of those "guided tours" through the history of ideas in which he has so frequently shown himself to be a past master. This time the master idea is the ideal, at once so ancient and so modern, of a universal human society. The purpose of the lectures is to examine the origins and some of the most significant manifestations of this ideal throughout the history of Western thought and to deduce therefrom as a lesson for the future certain fundamental conditions which must be verified if the present-day efforts to translate this ideal into a reality are not to remain sterile, like so many similar attempts in the past.

Those who have read the author's valuable eighty-eight-page foreword to the new English translation of St. Augustine's *City of God* by Fathers Gerald Walsh, S.J., and Demetrius Zema, S.J. ("Fathers of the Church Series," 1950), will at once recognize this present work as the amplification and prolongation of the main ideas contained therein. The historical conspectus which was there sketched rapidly in a few concluding pages Professor Gilson has now expanded into eight new chapters, the first two remaining largely the same as in the original foreword. It scarcely needs to be added that full justice is done to the intrinsic interest of the story by the lucid and vivid expository powers of the author.

The first chapter traces the genesis of the idea of a universal society

from its concrete foreshadowings in the quasi-universal empires of Alexander and Rome to its explicit emergence in the Christian notion of a universal Church or spiritual society laying claim *de jure* to the allegiance of all men.

The second chapter narrates the first attempt by a great Christian thinker, St. Augustine, to insert this ideal of a universal spiritual society into the realistic context of concrete human history. Given original sin, human liberty, and the fact that adherence by faith to the Church must be a free act that cannot be imposed by force, St. Augustine concludes that the human race will in fact be split into two universal (but here below invisible) societies, the City of God, united by the love of God and the pursuit of eternal happiness to the contempt of the things of this world, and the City of Satan, or the Earthly City, united by self-love and the pursuit of earthly happiness to the contempt of God.

Now begin the attempted metamorphoses of the authentic City of God, with its strictly spiritual and freely accepted supernatural bond of union, into some form of all-inclusive and visible earthly society, either identified with the Church, juxtaposed to it, or dispensing with it, and deliberately setting as its goal (at least partial) some form of temporal political triumph. The first one which Professor Gilson presents is the Franciscan Roger Bacon's grandiose but naïvely Utopian project of a universal Christian republic ruled over by the Pope.

Next we watch unfold Dante's dream of a universal temporal empire, under a single Christian monarch, coexisting harmoniously with the Church, but strictly independent in its own sphere of the latter's power because based on the natural law expressed so admirably in Aristotle's philosophy.

Then follow in quick succession the daring attempt of Cardinal Nicholas of Cusa to overcome the barrier set up by faith and Christian dogma to world religious unity, by making of the Church itself a strictly universal religious society reconciling and embracing all religions in what they contain of valid truth; the Dominican Campanella's "City of the Sun," where pure reason, considered as practically equivalent to the essential truths of Christian wisdom, takes command; the Abbé de Saint-Pierre's project of a general political union of the European powers; Leibnitz's "City of [Christian] Philosophers," who have composed their religious as well as philosophical differences through his universal philosophy (thereby losing in the bargain, of course, practically all recognizable elements of their supernatural Christianity); and finally Auguste Comte's "City of Scientists," which carries the evolution all the way to its ultimate pole by explicitly repudiating its first parent, the City of God, and substituting for it an all-sufficient City of Man.

The chain of metamorphoses, therefore, stretches from one extreme pole, where the earthly city is taken over by the spiritual, to the other, where the City of God is identified with, and absorbed into, the earthly city. In presenting this tragic but illuminating story Professor Gilson disclaims any pretention to producing a work of scientific scholarship and is therefore content with sketching the successive stages only in broad general outline. But he has done this so well that in the strictly

historical part of his book he has made a contribution to the history of ideas that is not only interesting but valuable, and should force even scholars to reflect more deeply on the basic issues involved.

But there is always that controversial last chapter in Professor Gilson's books, where he steps out of his role of impartial historian to speak in his own name as Christian philosopher. He does it here again. This time he draws the lesson that the first and indispensable (though not sufficient) condition for the natural unity of one universal temporal society is the supernatural unity of one faith and one Church. As he put it in his 1950 foreword to the *City of God*, "*One world* is impossible without *one God* and *one Church*," or, as rephrased in the last sentence of the present work: "The city of men can be erected only in the shadow of the Cross, as a suburb of the City of God."

Here, much as he would wish that such a supernatural unity could be achieved, the reviewer must part company with the author when the latter insists on this unity as the condition for any future viable world society. Professor Gilson in this all too brief chapter has plunged into the midst of a complex and highly controverted problem. Both his arguments and his conclusion (as more than one European reviewer has pointed out) remain in their present form dangerously ambiguous and oversimplified. Nor does the conclusion follow with any rigor from the history traced so admirably in the preceding chapters. From a carefully selected series of extreme or oversimple, hence unsuccessful, experiments it by no means follows that some middle-of-the-road solution (for instance, some form of temporal state, adhering strictly to its intrinsically autonomous though extrinsically subordinate temporal end, and at the same time respectful, benevolent, but neutral towards a plurality of religions) is impossible. It may perhaps be a practical impossibility. But this book certainly does not prove it. In a word, while being sincerely grateful for Professor Gilson's book and its challenge to reflection, we feel obliged to register our own conclusion that Professor Gilson is indeed an excellent guide for the past, but not an equally sure guide for the future.

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The Discovery of the Mind. **By Bruno Snell. Translated by T. G. Rosenmeyer. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1953. Pp. xii + 324. $5.50.**

Bruno Snell presents a fine study of the origins of the Western way of thinking. He would, I think, be the first to agree that his work is only an introduction to the subject; much work still remains to be done to cover the field at all adequately.

The opening chapter gives an excellent analysis of some basic psychological words in Homer: the "parts" of the "soul" (*thymos, noos,* and *psyche*), as well as of various artivities of the soul such as seeing. Succeeding chapters are less technical and easily enough followed by the layman. Chapter two gives the religion of Homer as the basis of succeeding Greek speculation about the gods. Then follows in chronological order (chapters 3-7) an analysis of the achievements of the other great writers: the creation of lyric poetry, the origin of tragedy, and the transition from tragedy to philosophy as illustrated by Aristophanes's criticism of Euripides. In this section one is struck by the conspicuous absence of a treatment of Sophocles who receives about seven lines. Although two whole chapters are devoted to the myth—one in this section and one in the next—mention of Plato and his contributions in this field is rather negligible.

Chapters eight to ten are taken up with the call to virtue, comparison, and the creation of scientific thought. The last named essay was the one first written, and contains the heart of the book. It was written nineteen years before the last essay was concluded. Despite the long lapse of time in its writing, the book has a fairly well worked out unity.

The last three chapters contain sketches on *Humanitas,* on Callimachus, and on Virgil's *Eclogues.* The first two of these raise the question how the finds of the Greek mind became the general property of civilization; the last tries to illustrate how what was Greek had to be transformed so that it might become European. These last three chapters are interestingly done but do not fit completely into the unity of the theme.

The most important criticism to be made of the book is the occasional lack of unity. Professor Snell says early (p. 1) that there are three approaches to the works of the ancients: the "interpretive-aesthetic approach to the language," the "historical approach," and the "philosophical." We are never completely sure what he means by "philosophical." One gathers that it includes psychology, since he mentions the soul; logic, since he speaks of the laws of the mind such as the method of comparison; religion, since he speaks of the gods; and politics, since he speaks of the Greeks' developing a social sense. Whether he means to include all of them or not or even more, we are not told. At times, he leaves the "philosophical approach" for pages at a time. Ultimately he returns to it in the same chapter but only after what seems more of a digression from the subject or at least an over-amplified explanation. This is true of the chapter on Pindar (chap. 4) as well as of about half of the chapters on *Humanitas* (chap. 11) and on Callimachus (chap. 12).

Most readers would perhaps disagree with some statements of Professor Snell: "When shortly before his death Socrates made a last conscientious appraisal of his life, he tried his hand at the writing of verse, much as if he wished to fill a gap in the sum total of his experience before the end overtook him" (p. 112). So too with a statement made about the gods: "The Olympians have their full share of the passions, without however sacrificing an iota of their beauty" (p. 41). And again an odious comparison: "Laughter [at the gods] is part of the meaning . . . of life, and it is therefore, in the eyes of the Greeks, more godlike than the *sour solemnity* [italics inserted] we associate with piety" (p. 41). Most Christians would disagree with the last two statements.

Nonetheless, Professor Snell has written an interesting and provocative book. He was fortunate in his translator, T. G. Rosenmeyer, who made the English version very readable despite the many difficult ideas which had to be expressed.

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NOTES ON FOREIGN BOOKS

The Analogy Between God and the World. **An Investigation of Its Background and Interpretation of Its Use by Thomas of Aquino. By Hampus Lyttkens. Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksells Boktryckeri, 1952. Pp. 493. Paper, 18 Sw. crs.**

The author has undertaken this investigation of analogy in St. Thomas because, as he states it, Thomists have not been entirely faithful to the thought of their master. In the first chapter, the author investigates the backgrounds of analogy in philosophers and Christians from Plato to St. Albert the Great; the second chapter considers St. Thomas's uses of analogy; the third chapter takes up various interpretations of analogy by Thomists; the fourth chapter looks at the types of analogy in St. Thomas himself; the fifth chapter investigates St. Thomas's doctrine on causal analogy and the sixth chapter, on analogy of proportionality; the seventh chapter indicates the consequences in theology of analogy.

On the whole, this is an excellent study. It has, however, several deficiencies. First, it does not pay sufficient attention to chronology—which would have reinforced the author's conclusions considerably; secondly, the author does not understand St. Thomas's use of philosophical reasoning in theology; and thirdly, the author is influenced by what seem to be Barthian considerations about our knowledge of God. These defects, however, will by no means excuse any serious historian or follower of St. Thomas for ignoring this book.

Les frontières de la morale et de la religion. **By Geddes MacGregor. Paris: Aubier, 1952. Pp. 188. Paper.**

This book consists of three parts. The first is a general analysis of the problem, in which the author asks first whether there is any relation at all between ethics and religion, and concludes that they are necessarily related if they are to be adequate even in their own order. He maintains further that both are necessarily related to metaphysics. Finally, he places the problem in the general area of value. The second part is a critical analysis of recent British thought on morality and religion. The third part attempts a solution which recognizes the distinction and the mutual complementarity of morality and religion.

This is a thoughtful book by one who has a good understanding of the problem and a clear insight into the popular fragmentary solutions of the present-day neopositivist and secularist.

La Rebelion de los imperativos. **By Luis B. Joselevich. Buenos Aires: author, 1953. Pp. 288. Paper.**

In the form of a Ciceronic dialogue, the author discusses philosophy,

art, justice, human relationships. A profusion of italics and exclamation marks seems to be intended to cover up a profound confusion of thought—another case of "a little knowledge . . ."

La Filosofia de Martin Heidegger. **By Alfonse De Waelhens. Tr. with an introd. by Ramon Ceñal, S.J. 2nd ed. Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas, 1952. Pp. lxxiii + 390.**

This work of De Waelhens's is acknowledged to be one of the basic studies on Heidegger. The present book is an excellent translation. The long introductory note by the translator has been added in the second edition. It is an analysis of the basic themes of Heidegger's thought, with special attention to works that have appeared since 1940. A bibliographical supplement lists the books and articles about Heidegger written since the first Spanish translation in 1945.

Theologia Naturalis. **By Joseph Hellin, S.J. "Cursus Philosophicus, V. Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos." Madrid: Editorial Catolica, 1950. Pp. xxvii + 928.**

Volumes of the B.A.C. can be obtained in the United States from Academy Library Guild, Box 549, Fresno, California. In general, they are nicely printed editions at a remarkably low price (the binding is weak, but still excellent for the price). The editions of St. Thomas, for example, are well within the reach of even a poor student.

The present volume is a very detailed, highly organized textbook, with all the apparatus of adversaries, objections, scholia. It also offers readings for each thesis. The point of view of the author is rather closely Suarezian.

Individuation. Die Tiefenpsychologie von Carl Gustav Jung. **By Josef Goldbrunner. Freiburg: Erich Wewel Verlag, 1949. Pp. 212. DM 7.20; half-cloth, DM 6.20.**

This is a study and criticism of the theoretical psychology of C. G. Jung. In the first part the author synthesizes the psychological doctrines of Jung around the basic idea of "individuation"—that is, the activation of the personal and collective unconscious dominants in the total personality. This unified point of view enables the author to present the extensive writings of Jung in a relatively small compass with admirable accuracy and profound understanding. In the second part the author takes up the presuppositions and conclusions of Jung concerning religion, anthropology, ethics, education, and pastoral care of souls. This criticism is at once sympathetic and penetrating. Many Catholics have been taken in by Jung's apparent favoring of religion. Such misapprehensions could be readily corrected by this well-documented study. It is highly recommended to philosophers and theologians.

La Persona humana. **By Ismael Quiles, S.J. Buenos Aires: Espasa-Calpe Argentina, 1952. Pp. 494.**

The first edition of this work, published in 1942, was a much smaller book, of only 240 pages. The enlargement of the present edition is due mainly to the data drawn from phenomenology and existentialism, and to the problems caused by the emergence of totalitarianism.

The treatment of personality is divided into three parts: psychological, metaphysical, and moral. It aims at being a complete synthesis of the traditional Scholastic doctrine of personality with all the relevant modern data. In this, the author is admirably successful; though the book is filled with a great many details, the master plan is always clearly visible, and the progress of the argument can always be easily followed.

If anything is to be unfavorably criticized, it is the occasionally weak presentation of the Scholastic view. For example, the metaphysical principle of personality is taken up in a footnote (pp. 244-46). Again, sense and intellect, experience and metaphysics, are treated somewhat superficially as simple alternatives (pp. 210-11).

There is a useful bibliography.

Chemins et impasses de l'ontologie heideggerienne à propos des **Holzwege. By Alphonse De Waelhens. Louvain, Nauwelaerts; Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1953. Pp. 52. Paper, 78¢**

This study, by the most important interpreter of Heidegger, is a presentation and reflection on the points raised by the latter's *Holzwege.* De Waelhens takes up Heidegger's notions of tool and work of art, of reality and truth, and of the thought of Nietzsche, Rilke, and Anaximander. In all these points, the problem is that of the relation between a being (*l'étant*) and "what it is to be" (*l'être*), of the meaning of "what it is to be," and of "presence." These questions, says the author, have not only been ignored, they have been totally forgotten by the scientific mind. This is a thoughtful and thought-provoking book.

El Hombre en la encrucijada. **By José Ferrater Mora. Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana, 1952. Pp. 343. Paper, $30.00 (Argentine).**

This is a study in the history of ideas, centering around the notion of the crisis that occurs when men become aware of a collectivity and the necessity or possibility of entering into it. The first part of the book, treating philosophy, anxiety, and renovation, begins with ancient Greece: the Cynics, Stoics, and Platonists. This is followed by a study of the eschatological movements like that of the Jews and of the problems of the power and poverty of Rome. This first part concludes with the early history of the Christian West. The second part, about "crisis and reconstruction," takes up first the problem of the modern age. The author then considers the crisis to have taken place in three stages: the crisis of the few (the elite, the oligarchy) in the seventeenth century, of the many in the age of revolution, and of all men in the

twentieth century. The final chapter of the second part takes up contemporary society, whose problems are said to be three: the problem of technique or science, that of the organization of society, and that of the salvation of the individual.

The method of the author is descriptive: he is more concerned with exposing the problems than finding their causes or suggesting solutions. With regard to the latter, his solutions are proposed very tentatively and in very general terms.

Catena Aurea in Quatuor Evangelia. **By St. Thomas Aquinas. Ed. by Angelo Guarienti, O.P. Turin: Marietti, 1953. 2 vols. Vol. I, pp. vi + 566; vol. II, pp. 598.**

This new edition is printed in a style in harmony with the previously published post-war volumes. Scripture citations are printed in bold face. No other changes have been introduced by the editor.

Die Philosophie des Xenophanes von Kolophon. **By Adolf Lumpe. Munich: Foth, 1952. Pp. 67. Paper.**

This dissertation takes up the following points of the philosophy of Xenophanes: natural theology, theory of knowledge, philosophy of nature, and anthropology. The work concludes with an indication of Xenophanes' influence upon later philosophers, especially Parmenides and Heraclitus. The thesis is a useful contribution to the history of Greek philosophy.

Der Mensch in seinem Dasein. Philosophische Anthropologie, erster Teil. **By Georg Siegmund. Freiburg: Herder, 1953. Pp. 250. Paper.**

This is the first part of a projected three-volume work on rational psychology. The first volume takes up the introduction to the philosophical investigation of man, the structure of the world within which man moves, the relation between consciousness and nature, monistic views of man, and the unity of man. Volume two will treat of men and animals, and volume three of the nature of man.

The author's wide acquaintance with modern philosophy, biology, and medicine are put to advantageous use throughout the book. Teachers and students will find it valuable for reference work.

El Mito de la nueva Cristianidad. **By Leopoldo Palacios. 2nd ed. Madrid: Ediciones Rialp, 1952. Pp. 153.**

This is a study of Christian humanism, in which the author takes a very critical attitude toward Maritain. The author says in his introduction that Christian humanism is, in his mind, an attempt to find a middle position between the city of God and the city of this world. In the first book, the author considers the history of the Latin West from the viewpoint of humanism. In the second book, he considers the limitations of both natural ethics and moral theology, as well as the

imperfections both of the secular state and the Holy Empire. In the third, he takes up humanism and the concepts of the community and the person.

Philosophisches Wörterbuch. **By Walter Brugger, S.J. 5th ed. Freiburg: Herder, 1953. Pp. xxxix + 502.**

The first edition of this reference work was published in 1945. Later editions put new materials into an appendix. The fifth edition finally is entirely reset; the materials previously in the appendix have been incorporated into the body of the text; new articles have been added and many old ones rewritten; bibliographies have been brought up to date, and the history of philosophy section has been brought up to 1950. The author has consulted many collaborators; the section on American philosophy, for example, has been carefully checked by an outstanding American historian.

The work is divided into two main parts. The first part (pp. 1-396) contains a dictionary of terms; it is preceded by a key to subordinate terms. The second part (pp. 397-480) is an outline of the history of philosophy and is followed by an index of names. All articles contain internal references to related terms, so that the book is not a mere dictionary but a real philosophical tool. By using small type, many abbreviations, and many symbols, the work contains much more matter than might appear at first sight. It is an indispensable library tool.

Die Grundakte des Geistes. **By Irmgard Gindl. Vienna: Herder, 1953. Pp. 80. Paper, DM 3.**

This is a phenomenological investigation of certain characteristically human acts. The pattern of the book is built upon the list of acts as given by Max Scheler. The various moments of the study concern the object and the ego; the "I and you" situation; value; meaning; self-consciousness; and decision. In the various chapters, the author compares and contrasts the experience of children in these situations with animal behavior. In all of them, she finds characteristically spiritual activities.

Adagium "Appetitus Naturalis Non Potest Esse Frustra" in Doctrina Sancti Thomae. **By Hubert Van der Meulen, C.S.Sp. Gemert: Scholasticatus Major Congregationis Sancti Spiritus, 1952. Pp. 53. Paper, $1.00.**

This study is a part of the doctoral dissertation of the author. In it he takes up first the finality of nature in St. Thomas and then the adage itself. It is a careful and well-documented study which should be useful to philosophers and theologians alike.

There is a very useful bibliography (pp. 43-53); there is no index.

Dieu est-il mort? Propos sur l'athéisme: Lénine et saint-Thomas. **By L. J. Moreau. Paris: Lethielleux, 1953. Pp. 88. Paper, fr. 230.**

This is a popular presentation rather than a scholarly study, yet the level of discussion seems to imply a rather well-educated reader and at certain points seems even to presuppose more than a mere acquaintance with philosophy. Possibly it is intended for Catholic readers, to help them to bring to bear the knowledge they already have on the problems of atheism, human rights, truth in knowledge, and the possibility of transcending experience.

Philosophie de la valeur. **By Raymond Ruyer. Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1952. Pp. 216. Paper, 260 fr.**

This study of value is divided into two parts. In the first, the author attempts an impartial description of value theories, which is a kind of unified summary of the points brought out by differing writers on value. In the second part the author is mainly concerned with classifying value theories, and the heads under which he classifies them are the following: naturalist, naturalist theories of efficiency, nonnaturalist theories of efficiency; realist theories, and theories of active participation. In his conclusion, the author inclines toward the latter.

Méthodologie, notions géométriques. **By Jean-Louis Destouches. Paris: Librairie Gauthier-Villars, 1953. Pp. xiv + 228. Paper, $8.90.**

This book consists of two distinct parts. The first part, intended as a general introduction to physical theory, explains such notions as deduction and the place of mathematics in a theory about real objects. The second part (pp. 72-223) is an introduction to modern geometry as the logic of physical theory. The book is intended as a textbook and presents its materials simply and clearly.

Les systèmes axiomatiques de la théorie des ensembles. **By Hao Wang and Robert McNaughton. Paris, Librairie Gauthier-Villars; Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1953. Pp. 54. Paper, $2.38.**

This is an excellent introduction to the theory of classes, well written and easily intelligible. Unfortunately, the offset printing is uneven and sometimes hard to read.

Saint Thomas d'Aquin et la vie de l'église. **By André Hayen, S.J. Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1952. Pp. 109. Paper, 90¢**

No Thomist can afford to overlook this book. In fact, no philosopher who has any understanding of the nature and historical function of philosophy can ignore this profound discussion. Father Hayen, taking up the theme of the "currents of thought in the thirteenth century," as they are expressed by Gilson, Van Steenberghen, and Chenu, tries to lay down the distinctive achievement of St. Thomas. According to

him, Thomism is a "theologal realism" (a coinage which by *no* means is equivalent to "theological realism"), which includes both philosophy and theology (and thereby transforms both). In passing, Father Hayen gives a brilliant answer to the question often heard nowadays, "Why is not the theology of St. Thomas more Christocentric?"

Filosofos mexicanos del siglo XVI. **By Oswaldo Robles. Mexico: Libreria de Manuel Porrua, 1950. Pp. 142; with 15 plates. $20.00 (Mexican).**

This little work fills a notable lacuna in our historical knowledge. The three most important men treated are Fray Alonso de la Vera Cruz, Fray Tomás de Mercado, O.P., and Antonio Rubio, S.J. The accounts are well documented and well written. There is a useful bibliography; the plates represent frontispieces and pictures of some of the philosophers treated.

Cattolicesimo e pensiero moderno. **By Armando Carlini. Brescia: Morcelliana, 1953. Pp. 304. Paper, L. 1000.**

The purpose of this book is to confront modern thought with Christian philosophy (understood in a rather broad sense). There are four sections in the book. The first is a general discussion of the relation between the Christian revelation and philosophical thought, stressing the necessity of their close co-operation. The second treats of creation and shows how the Christian revelation of creation has made the problem of existence an acute one for Western philosophy. The third section takes up the theological origin of the concept of personality. The fourth discusses original sin. In an appendix the author writes briefly about the actualism of M. Blondel, of Scholasticism, and of some of the ideas of Ugo Spirito. The author's own position in the book might perhaps be classified with what several recent writers have called "the Christian philosophy of the spiritual."

Essai sur le dialogue. **By Jacques Delesalle. Paris: Téqui [1953]. Pp. 124. Paper, 380 fr.**

This is a sensitive and sympathetic study of the problem of "communication," which has been raised by existentialism and has been felt by those who have come into contact with that movement or with fanatical Communism. The first chapter is a study of language itself, in its tension between sense and thought. The second finds difficulty in conversation, especially in the inviolable distinction of individual awareness and the block of sentiment. The third chapter maintains that a solution cannot be found either in rationalism or in existentialism, but only in Christ, who is both subsistent reason and human existant. There are two appendices: one on the dialectic of Plotinus, the other on communication according to Merleau-Ponty and Sartre.

Éléments de théorie des quanta et de mécanique ondulatoire. **By Louis de Broglie. Paris: Librairie Gauthier-Villars, 1953. Pp. 302. Paper, $8.91.**

This volume represents the essentials of the course taught by the author to the candidates for degrees in physical theory. It differs from the corresponding textbooks used in American schools by its less strongly experimental character and by its more explicit attention to the function of mathematical and logical reasoning in the construction of physical theories. Since this is its character, and since its author is himself a master of physical theory, it is particularly valuable for the students of the philosophy of science.

Pages choisies d'analyse générale. **By Maurice Fréchet. Paris, Librairie Gauthier-Villars; Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1953. Pp. 213. Paper, $5.94.**

This book consists of a selection of articles and papers previously presented by the author. In some few cases they have been shortened for this collection. The papers are grouped in chapters with the following headings: a synthetic view; functional spaces; functional analysis; abstract spaces; and general analysis. These papers are of particular interest to the mathematician, to the historian of mathematics, and to the philosopher of science.

La philosophie italienne contemporaine. **By Michele-Federico Sciacca. Tr. by Marie-Louise Roure. Preface by Régis Jolivet. Paris: E. Vitte [1953]. Pp. 296. Paper, 1500 fr.**

This is an extremely valuable work. The author's previous two-volume work, *Il Secolo XX* (2nd ed., 1947) is much fuller and contains 200 pages of bibliography. But to many, the present volume will be much more accessible and, because of its more summary character, will be more likely to be read. The author is himself very prominent in the vital renewal of philosophy in Italy. His own energetic upholding of metaphysics and "philosophy of the spirit" gives him an ability to summarize and criticize, all the while giving a fair and adequate presentation which a mere reporter could not give. On the other hand, his personal acquaintance with the movements and men of whom he writes gives him an understanding which only a native can have. The value of the book is greatly increased by the selected bibliographies at the end of each chapter.

Les dimensions de l'etre et du temps. **By Jules Chaix-Ruy. Paris: E. Vitte [1953]. Pp. 316. Paper, 1200 fr.**

The existentialists assert that there is a radical discontinuity between "existence" (understood in their special sense as "conscious human existence") and being. On the basis of this distinction, many existentialisms have taken an idealist turn. The author thinks that at the

basis of this interpretation is a Kantian notion of time as a purely transcendental form. Consequently, he investigates the notion of time itself and its relation to being. In his introduction he compares the notions of being, essence, and existence. He then considers existence, spatio-temporal relations, time and temporality, thought, being, and essence.

Every serious student of the theory of knowledge will derive great benefit from these reflections. In particular, those who have been to any extent affected by the existentialist discussion of existence will find this book helpful.

Le marteau et la tenaille. **By René Duvillard. Preface by Gustave Thibon. Paris: E. Vitte [1953]. Pp. 176. Paper, 480 fr.**

Under the image of the hammer and tongs, the author expresses his personal impressions of the conflict found in the world and in man. He deals in the first chapter with the universe, then with the tree of life, the divided city, the dualism of man, the mystery of God, Christ, and the Church.

Written in the form of loosely related paragraphs, and in a vivid, imaginative style, these reflections could serve the purpose of spiritual reading.

Brèves réflexions sur l'athéisme marxiste. **By M. Duquesne. "Croire et Savoir." Paris: Téqui, 1953. Pp. vi + 126. Paper, 380 fr.**

This study of Marxist atheism is divided into two parts. The first part treats Marxist humanism both from the theoretical and from the practical viewpoint. The second part criticizes this materialism, trying to discover the truth and error in it. The book is written on a non-technical but still serious level and honestly faces the problem of human misery on which the Communists capitalize so heavily. The author concludes that integral Christianity is the only answer for this problem that will not throw men into a worse situation.

Filsofía de la educación. **By Angel Gonzalez Alvarez. Mendoza: Universidad Nacional de Cuyo, 1952. Pp. 250. Paper.**

This presentation of the philosophy of education is built upon the rigidly interpreted categories of "Thomistic" metaphysics. The first chapter analyzes the entitative structure of education, studying its essence and existence. The second studies its essence; namely, its matter and form. The third is an account of the educational process, taking up its phenomenology, its metaphysical presuppositions, and its essence. The fourth presents the efficient cause of education. The fifth, concerned with the regulation of the educational process, studies the exemplar cause of education. The last, finally, takes up the final cause of education.

Elementi di una filosofia della potenzialità. **By Leone Vivante. Firenze: Vallecchi Editore, 1953. Pp. 112. Paper, 500 Lire.**

This book, consisting of four lectures delivered in various universities of the United States, is an excellent introduction to Vivante's thought. The first chapter clarifies what he means by an underived cause; that is, the creativity and indetermination of the free act. The second chapter explains the immediate existentiality of thought to itself; the third takes up the author's notion of virtuality-actuality; and the fourth applies his philosophy to art criticism.

Les émotions et le personnalité de l'enfant. **By Philippe Malrieu. Paris: J. Vrin, 1952. Pp. 344. Paper.**

This study in child psychology is done much in the manner of Piaget. The first part considers psychological progress during the first year of life, stressing emotions, organization of behavior, intelligence. The second part takes up the role of emotions and feelings in the formation of language, imagination, and thought. The third part correlates the stages of personality development and the levels of consciousness.

The author is strongly opposed to fixism, intellectualism, and faculty psychology, and marshals some telling evidence against these hypotheses. He is also opposed to brute empiricism and exaggerated evolutionism.

Erlösung und Vollendung. **By Alwin Mittasch. Meisenheim am Glan: Westkulturverlag Anton Hain, 1953. Pp. 258. DM 15.50; paper, 13.50.**

This work in the philosophy of religion is a study of the concept of salvation. The author first investigates the various feelings and needs in man and the world to which the concept of salvation answers (Chapters I-VI). Three transitional chapters deal with pessimism and existentialism, the dualism of theory and practice, and the relation of religion to ethics. The remaining chapters (X-XXII) deal with various forms and kinds of salvation offered in various religions.

There is a bibliography, but no index.

Der philosophische Heilsbegriff. **By Rudolf Schottlaender. "Monographien zur philosophischen Forschung," VI. Meisenheim am Glan: Westkulturverlag Anton Hain, 1952. Pp. 160. DM 14; paper, DM 12.**

The author considers that there is at present a serious crisis in ethical theory; and by a crisis he means that ethicians have refused to give any philosophical judgments about current problems, as if doctors were to refuse to discuss or treat a current epidemic. He thinks that this is because ethics has been misconceived. As a corrective, he proposes that the object of ethics be considered to be "the 'health' of man" (*Heil* is a singularly untranslatable term, like the Latin *salus:*

it means "health," "welfare," "well-being," "salvation," "prosperity," and, as adjective, even "holy"). By stating the object of ethics in this way, the author hopes to restore to ethics its character as a practical knowledge. This is a valuable study, in view of some of the current denaturing of ethics into a grammar of emotive language.

Geschichte der Philosophie, I. Die grieschische Philosophie, erster Teil. **By Whilhelm Capelle. Sammlung Göschen." 2nd ed. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1953. Pp. 135. Paper, DM 2.40.**

This part of the history of Greek philosophy covers the period from Thales to Leucippus. The treatment is brief but carefully done. There is a selected bibliography of four pages, and a brief index.

Geschichte der Philosophie, VIII. Die Philosophie des neunzehnten, Jahrhunderts I. **By Gerhard Lehmann. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1953. Pp. 149. Paper, DM 2.40.**

Geschichte der Philosophie, IX. Die Philosophie des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts, II. **By Gerhard Lehmann. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1953. Pp. 166. Paper, DM 2.40.**

These two volumes are in the small format of the "Sammlung Göschen." Though small, they contain a surprising amount of information. The analyses are careful and quite detailed. Bibliographies, as is to be expected, give mainly German works as secondary sources and studies. But in this way they provide a valuable complement for research use.

La Persona. Su esencia, su vida, su mundo. **By Octavio N. Derisi. La Plata: Instituto de Filosofia, Universidad Nacional, 1950. Pp. 394. Paper.**

Many of the chapters of this book have been previously published as articles; nevertheless, the book is more than a mere collection of essays, since it is unified by its theme and the philosophical position of its author. In the first chapter, the author takes up the phenomenology and ontology of the person; in the second, he treats the metaphysics of knowledge; in the third, he discusses the object of the will and the origin of the problem of morality; in the fourth, he sketches the social and cultural ambit of man; in the fifth, he states that man is transcended in three areas: by the object of thought, by reality, and by God; in the sixth, the author takes up the relations between man and society; in the seventh, he considers some antinomies in man, especially that of communicability and immanence; in the eighth, he outlines a personalistic humanism. The author is keenly aware of the various currents of contemporary thought and seeks to retain what is best in it and at the same time to uncover and reject its errors.

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF CURRENT PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS PUBLISHED IN NORTH AMERICA

For the purposes of this bibliography, "philosophy" will be understood in a very broad sense. It will include works in other fields—such as sociology, aesthetics, and politics—that involve philosophical principles and problems.

"Current" books will be understood to include new books, revised editions, and reprints if the previous printing had been out of stock for a notable period of time, or if there is a notable difference in price, format, and the like.

The procedure is as follows:

1. *Books announced for publication will be listed in the issue which next appears after the announcement is received.*
2. *Books actually published will be listed in the subsequent issue, even though they were already listed in accordance with No. 1 above.*
3. *Books Received by* THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN *will be listed with full bibliographical information and a descriptive and/or critical note in the subsequent issue, even though they were already listed in accordance with No. 1 and/or No. 2. This will be done even if a full review is to appear later.*

ANSELM, ST. *Opera Omnia.* Ed. by Dom Francis of Sales Schmitt, O.S.B. 6 vols. New York: Barnes & Noble, 1953. $50.00.

[AVERROES.] *Averrois Cordubensis Commentarium Magnum in Aristotelis* De Anima *Libros.* Ed. by F. Stuart Crawford. "Corpus Commentariorum Averrois in Aristotelem." Cambridge: Mediaeval Academy of America, 1953. Pp. xxiv + 592. $10.00.

This critical edition of the *Great Commentary* of Averroes is Volume VI, 1, of the Latin versions of Averroes. The editor informs us that the Arabic text of this *Commentary* has been lost and that the Hebrew version has been made from a late copy of the Latin version of Michael Scotus, which is here edited. The editor has established his basic text, after a careful study of the manuscripts, upon Codex Paris. Bibl. Nat. lat. 15453, and has followed the Juntae edition of 1550 for the arrangement into printed lines (but the folio numbering for the latter edition has not been followed).

This *Commentary* of Averroes is an extremely important work, and the editor as well as the publishers deserve the gratitude of all scholars.

BALLOU, RICHARD BOYD. *The Individual and the State. The Modern Challenge to Education.* Boston: Beacon-Press, 1953, Pp. xxviii + 305. $4.50.

As Professor Robert Ulich states in his foreword, this book asks fundamental questions about the nature of the student, of knowledge, and of the society for which a student is prepared. Though the book is suitable for philosophy of education courses, it is the kind of book that should be read meditatively by young teachers and students preparing to be teachers, as well as by parents.

BESTOR, ARTHUR E., JR. *Educational Wastelands. The Retreat from Learning in our Public Schools.* Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press, 1953.

Pp. 226. $3.50.

The author examines the philosophy of education current in a large sector of the people professionally concerned with education and finds it aimless and geared to mediocrity. He considers the effects of such a philosophy in educational practices. He then proposes a reform in terms of liberal education and professional standards. This is an important contribution to the philosophy of education.

BOULOGNE, CHARLES-DAMIAN, O.P. *My Friends the Senses.* Tr. by Jane Howes. Foreword by Gerald Vann, O.P. New York: P. J. Kenedy & Sons, 1953. Pp. xiv + 206. $3.00.

This book is mainly a religious meditation on the wonderful character of our senses and the ways in which they can help in the spiritual life. Parts of the book, however, could be used as supplementary reading in philosophy classes, especially for students whose scientific-technical training has led them to despise simple, natural sense experience.

BROWN, D. MACKENZIE. *The White Umbrella.* Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1953. Pp. 220. $3.75.

CAJETAN, THOMAS DEVIO, CARDINAL. *The Analogy of Names* and *The Concept of Being.* Tr. with notes by Edward A. Bushinski, C.S.Sp., and Henry J. Koren, C.S.Sp. "Duquesne Studies, Philosophical Series," 4. Pittsburgh: Duquesne Univ. Press, 1953. Pp. x + 93. $2.25; paper, $1.50.

This careful, sober translation will be a real boon to students who are unable to read Cajetan's Latin works with facility. There is no need to point out the basic importance of the *Analogy of Names* in most present-day Thomistic writers, even when they think they are basing themselves on St. Thomas. The translators are convinced that Cajetan is entirely faithful to St. Thomas and merely systematized the latter's doctrine. There are a selected bibliography and an index.

CASSIRER, ERNST. *The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms.* Vol. 1, *Language.* Tr. from the German by Ralph Manheim. Preface and introd. by Charles W. Hendel. New Haven, Yale Univ. Press. Pp. 342. $5.00.

COLLINS, JAMES. *The Mind of Kierkegaard.* Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1953. Pp. xiv + 304. $4.50.

This work on Kierkegaard concentrates on the philosophical aspects of his thought; that is, on those insights and views of his which have relevance for philosophy. In successive chapters, the author takes up the life and personality of Kierkegaard, his view of the spheres of existence, the ethical outlook and its limitations, the attack on Hegelianism, the meaning of existence, the human individual, becoming a Christian, and Kierkegaard and Christian philosophy.

This careful and penetrating study is complemented with a short but helpful bibliographical note and a detailed index.

[DESCARTES, RENÉ.] *Descartes' Philosophical Writings.* Selected and tr. by Norman Kemp Smith. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1953. Pp. vii + 316. $5.00.

As the translator has remarked in his *New Studies in the Philosophy of Descartes,* many important studies in Cartesianism have been published in the past fifty years, and consequently translations have to be made with greater precision. The present work contains the *Rules,* the *Discourse on Method,* and the *Meditations on First Philosophy* complete; there are selections from the *Letters, Replies to the Objections,* the *Passions of the Soul,* and the *Search after Truth.*

DUFF, J. WIGHT. *The Literary History of Rome: From the Origins to the*

Close of the Golden Age. Ed. by A. M. Duff. New York: Barnes & Noble, 1953. Pp. 535. $7.50.

EYSENCK, HANS JURGEN. *The Structure of Human Personality.* New York: Wiley & Sons, 1953. Pp. 367. $5.75.

FOERSTER, FRIEDRICH WILHELM. *Christ and the Human Life.* Tr. from the second German ed. by Daniel F. Coogan, Jr. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1953. Pp. ix + 333. $5.00.

Though this book is mainly theological, it should be of considerable interest and value to all Christian ethicians. The book has two parts: Christ and the human soul, and Christ and the human life. The audience to which the author has principally addressed his remarks is that of the well-educated present day non-Christian. The author's own philosophical position (to the extent that he has one) is that of Christian Platonism. His procedure is not that of technical philosophy, but rather the rhetorical method of argument by example. The instances are well chosen, and some of them are outstanding phenomenological descriptions of states of mind typical of the Christian and the non-Christian.

FRAENKEL, ABRAHAM. *Abstract Set Theory.* New York: Humanities Press, 1953. Pp. 480. $10.00.

FREMANTLE, MRS. ANNE JACKSON (ed.). *A Treasury of Early Christianity.* New York: Viking Press, 1953. Pp. 639. $6.00.

GAYNOR, FRANK. *Dictionary of Mysticism.* New York: Philosophical Lib., 1953. Pp. 208. $5.00.

In view of the increased interest in Oriental philosophy on the part of English-speaking students and the perverse tendency of most Orientalists to use esoteric transliterations without explanation, a book such as this becomes a necessary tool. Most of the more than 2200 terms (the publisher's count) are defined very briefly, but even that much is a help.

GERHART, EUGENE. *American Liberty and "Natural Law."* Boston: Beacon Press, 1953. Pp. xi + 212. $3.00.

An introduction by Roscoe Pound sets the methodology for this book: the use of history to refute a philosophical position. The author goes through the history of the idea of natural law, carefully documenting all the variations and all the authoritarian uses to which the idea was put, and equally carefully refraining from other documentation. He concludes that only the "democratic" definition of natural law is compatible with American liberty. The book is a clear presentation of the modern "liberal" and naturalistic point of view.

HEGEL, GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH. *The Philosophy of Hegel.* Ed. by Carl J. Friedrich. Tr. from the German. New York: Modern Lib., 1953. Pp. 616. $1.25.

HEPNER, HARRY. *The Best Things in Life.* New York: B. C. Forbes, 1953. Pp. 258. $3.95.

HILTNER, SEWARD. *Sex Ethics and the Kinsey Reports.* New York: Association Press, 1953. Pp. 249. $3.00.

HOFFMAN, PAUL GRAY, and OTHERS. *The Present Danger.* Dallas, Southern Methodist Univ. Press. Pp. 105. $2.00.

HOSPERS, JOHN. *An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis.* New York: Prentice-Hall, 1953. Pp. 544. $5.95.

HUTCHINS, ROBERT M. *The Conflict in Education in a Democratic Society.* New York: Harper & Bros., 1953. Pp. vii + 112. $2.00.

In this series of lectures, the author considers first the prevailing philosophies of education in the United States: that of adjustment to

the environment, of meeting immediate needs, of social reform, and of the doctrine that there is no doctrine. He finds these philosophies inadequate by reason of their results and inadequate bases. As a basis of education, he proposes an understanding of man as a rational animal and the conviction that truth can be found and a scale of values established. On this basis he proposes a truly liberal education for all and voices the hope that the university can again become a center of thought and communication among educated men.

KRISHNAMURTI, JIDDU. *Education and the Significance of Life.* New York: Harper & Bros., 1953. Pp. 125. $1.50.

LANDSBERG, PAUL-LOUIS. *The Experience of Death. The Moral Problem of Suicide.* Tr. by Cynthia Rowland. Foreword by Martin Jarrett-Kerr, C.R. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1953. Pp. xii + 102. $2.50.

These are two intensely personal, phenomenological reflections on the problems mentioned in the titles. The author, a brilliant young French philosopher, died in a concentration camp during the war. This kind of book is invaluable, not only for meditative reading, but, and perhaps especially, for helping young students realize that the problems they take up in philosophy courses are real and vital problems.

LANGMACK, HOLGER CHRISTIAN. *God and the Universe. Unity of Science and Religion.* New York: Philosophical Lib., 1953. Pp. 173. $4.75.

This is an attempt to synthesize science and religion by way of mathematical relativity. The author wishes to construct a new logic (the logic of relation) and a new mathematics (time mathematics). The good intent, the seriousness, and the native ability of the author are beyond question. The absence of philosophical training and knowledge of the history of philosophy is painful.

LAUCKS, IRVING F. *A Speculation in Reality.* New York: Philosophical Lib., 1953. Pp. 154.

The author tells us that though he had at one time been a materialist, he became convinced that there was a nonmaterial reality, man's soul. His arguments are gathered from microphysics, chemistry, biology, evolution, and psychic phenomena. This work is a commendable attempt; it could have profited by a little knowledge of philosophy.

LINDBERG, JOHN. *Foundations of Social Survival.* New York; Columbia Univ. Press. Pp. 268. $3.50.

LODGE, RUPERT CLENDON. *Plato's Theory of Art.* New York: Humanities Press, 1953. Pp. 324. $5.00.

MELAND, BERNARD E. *Higher Education and the Human Spirit.* Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1953. Pp. ix + 204. $4.00.

The author, professor of constructive theology at the University of Chicago, presents a sound and inclusive philosophy of education. He sees some good in the ideals of Dewey and even more in the proposals of Hutchins. But he insists that over and above the practical and the purely speculative factors in higher education, a complete philosophy of education must make room for the humanistic values and the spiritual values of religion. This is an important and well-reasoned book. However, the implementation of the program advocated is not clearly expressed, except that, to some extent, a "least common denominator" of religion seems to be implied.

MENDE, TIBOR. *World Power in the Balance.* New York: Noonday Press, 1953. $3.00.

MOODY, JOSEPH N., and OTHERS (eds.). *Church and Society.* New York: Arts, Inc., 1953. Pp. 914. $12.00.

MOORE, GEORGE EDWARD. *Some Main Problems of Philosophy.* New York: Macmillan Co., 1953. Pp. 392. $4.50.

MURDOCH, IRIS. *Sartre, Romantic Rationalist.* New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1953. Pp. 78. $2.50.

NEEDHAM, H. A. (ed.). *Taste and Criticism in the Eighteenth Century. A Selection of Texts Illustrating the Evolution of Taste and the Development of Critical Theory.* New York: Barnes & Noble, 1953. Pp. 231. $2.50.

NEILL, THOMAS PATRICK. *The Rise and Decline of Liberalism.* Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co., 1953. Pp. 332. $5.50.

[NEWMAN, JOHN HENRY, CARDINAL.] *The Idea of a Liberal Education. A Selection from the Works of Newman.* Ed. by Fr. Henry Tristram. New York: Barnes & Noble, 1953. Pp. 220. $2.50.

[PICO DELLA MIRANDOLA, GIOVANNI.] *Oration on the Dignity of Man.* Lexington, Ky.: Anvil Press, 1953. Pp. 48. $8.50.

RAJU, POOLLA TIRUPATI. *Idealistic Thought of India.* Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1953. Pp. 454. $6.50.

Readings in the Philosophy of Science. Ed. by Herbert Feigl and May Brodbeck. Introductory essays by the authors. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1953. Pp. ix + 811. $6.00.

For excellent technical production and remarkably low cost, this book ranks with the other source-books published by the same company. Included are selections from Pap, Bridgman, Carnap, Reichenbach, Bergmann, Spence, Choen, Nagel, Hempel, Mach, Poincaré, Schlick, Einstein, Frank, Duhem, Campbell, Oppenheim, Kneale, Beck, Feigl, Russell, Madden, Skinner, MacCorquodale, Heehl, Passmore, Abel, Hook, Zilsel, Watkins, Lange, Wigner, and Grünbaum (named in the order of their first appearance). There are also a selected bibliography and detailed indices.

The limitations of the book lie in the artfully concealed principles of selection (especially in the bibliographies) and in the bald inaccuracies of Feigl's introductory essay, "The Scientific Outlook: Naturalism and Humanism" (pp. 8-18), as well as in his bland assumption that the philosophical analysts are the philosophers of science and democracy.

REICHENBACH, HANS. *Nomological Statements and Admissible Operations.* New York: Humanities Press, 1953. Pp. 136. $4.00.

RODWAY, A. E. *Godwin and the Age of Transition.* New York: Barnes & Noble, 1953. Pp. 231. $2.50.

SALOMON, ALBERT. *The Tyranny of Progress.* New York: Noonday Press; Jan., 1954. $2.75.

SARTRE, JEAN-PAUL. *Existential Psychoanalysis.* Tr. with an introd. by Hazel E. Barnes. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1953. Pp. 275. $4.75.

This book is made up of two sections taken from *L'être et le néant.* The title is taken from the second chapter of Part IV; it is followed by the chapter on bad faith, the second chapter of Part I. The translator intends to complete the translation in another volume.

In her introduction (pp. 1-40), the author attempts to present only those ideas and backgrounds of Sartre which are essential for understanding the present selections. Critical judgments are infrequent and usually concern Sartre's tendency to ignore (even while admitting) objective structures and historical data.

There is an index.

SMITH, NORMAN KEMP. *New Studies in the Philosophy of Descartes. Descartes as a Pioneer.* New York: St. Martin's Press, 1953. Pp. xii

+ 369. $5.00.

In 1902 the author published *Studies in the Cartesian Philosophy.* The present entirely new work, though it takes up many of the points and considerations of the former one, makes considerable use of the new studies that have appeared in the past half century. The author treats, after the manner of distinct essays, Descartes's method and the rules of method; his physical and physiological principles; his thoughts on the self; his theory of knowledge (mathematics, natural theology, physics and philosophy, metaphysics); his arguments for the existence of God; and his notions of substance and causality.

There are a selected bibliography and an index.

SMITH, RAYMOND. *Whitehead's Concept of Logic.* Westminster: Newman Press, 1953. Pp. 188. $3.00.

STRAUSS, LEO. *Natural Right and History.* "Charles R. Walgreen Foundation Lectures." Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1953. Pp. ix + 327. $5.00.

The author begins his study by considering the function of a historical study. Some writers had, by the use of history, concluded that there are no natural rights. It is necessary, therefore, to make a distinction between a historical study and historicism. He next investigates the popular modern distinction between fact and value. These are the methodological grounds of the investigation. The remaining chapters take up the origin of the idea of natural right, the classical formulations, the modern formulations by Hobbes and Locke, and the crisis of the modern formulations in Rousseau and Burke.

SYNAM, GERALD J. *The Good Political Ruler according to St. Thomas Aquinas.* Washington: Catholic Univ. of America Press, 1953. Pp. vii + 42. Paper.

This abstract of a dissertation summarizes the virtues which St. Thomas says a good ruler should have. The doctrine is taken mainly from the *De Rege et Regno,* with amplifications from others works, and contains a number of rhetorical and historical illustrations.

TARSKI, ALFRED; MOSTOWSKI, ANDREZEJ; and ROBINSON, RAPHAEL A. *Undecidable Theories.* New York: Humanities Press, 1953. Pp. 98. $3.00.

TAYLOR, F. SHERWOOD. *Man and Matter.* New York: McMullen Books, 1953. $3.50.

VAN LAER, P. HENRY. *Philosophico-Scientific Problems.* Tr. by Henry J. Koren, C.S.Sp. "Duquesne Studies, Philosophical Series," 3. Pittsburgh: Duquesne Univ. Press, 1953. Pp. xi + 168. $3.25; paper, $2.50.

This work consists of seven essays about problems in which science and philosophy meet. Their titles are: "The Value of Thomistic Philosophy in the Study of Physical Science"; "Extension as a Criterion of Matter"; "The Principle of Verification"; "The Possibility of Action at a Distance"; "Causality, Determinism, Previsibility and Modern Science"; "Causality and Finality with Respect to Physical Science"; and "On the Difference Between Mathematics and Science."

There is an index.

WESTACOTT, E. *Roger Bacon in Life and Legend.* New York: Philosophical Lib., 1953. Pp. 140. $3.75.

The author tells us that since no life of Roger Bacon exists in English, he will supply the lack, basing himself mainly on the work of Emile Charles (1861). He has also consulted a great many more

recent works. The book is written in very poor English. The author seems to lack all critical judgment and is quite uninformed about philosophy, theology, alchemy, and the proper spelling of Latin words.

WHICHER, STEPHEN E. *Freedom and Fate.* Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 1953. Pp. 219. $4.75.

WILD, JOHN. *Plato's Modern Enemies and the Theory of Natural Law.* Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1953. Pp. xi + 259. $5.50.

In several recent studies, Plato's state had been characterized as absolutistic and even proto-Fascist. In the first part of this book, Professor Wild compares these criticisms with Plato's own text and concludes that Plato's theory was a moral realism, which later developed into natural law theory. In the second part, the author studies the history of natural law and finds that the theory of Hobbes and Locke is widely divergent from those of their predecessors. He then relates natural law theories to the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle. In the third part, the author shows how pertinent natural law theory is to contemporary ethical theory and contemporary problems. There are indexes of names and subjects.

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[AVERROES.] *Averrois Cordubensis Commentarium Magnum in Aristotelis* De anima *Libros.* Ed. by F. Stuart Crawford. "Corpus Commentariorum Averrois in Aristotelem." Cambridge: Mediaeval Academy of America, 1953. Pp. xxiv + 592. $10.00.

BALLOU, RICHARD BOYD. *The Individual and the State. The Modern Challenge to Education.* Boston: Beacon Press, 1953. Pp. xxviii + 305. $4.50.

BESTOR, ARTHUR E., JR. *Educational Wastelands. The Retreat from Learning in our Public Schools.* Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press, 1953. Pp. 226. $3.50.

BOULOGNE, CHARLES-DAMIAN, O.P. *My Friends the Senses.* Tr. by Jane Howes. Foreword by Gerald Vann, O.P. New York: P. J. Kenedy & Sons, 1953. Pp. xiv + 206. $3.00.

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[DESCARTES, RENÉ.] *Descartes' Philosophical Writings.* Selected and tr. by Norman Kemp Smith. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1953. Pp. vii + 316. $5.00.

DE WAELHENS, ALPHONSE. *Chemins et impasses de l'ontologie heideggerienne à propos des Holzwege.* Louvain: Nauwelaerts; Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1953. Pp. 52. Paper, 78¢

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